Stop Your Worries about Worrying! An investigation into the cognitive correlates of worry by Bruin, G.O. (Gwendolijn Olivia) de
 
 
 
 
 
STOP YOUR WORRIES ABOUT WORRYING! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 905677266x 
 
Printed by Optima Grafische Communicatie, Rotterdam 
Cover design based on Fractal art by Ben Keller 
 
© G.O. de Bruin, Rotterdam, 2006  
 
 
 
 
STOP YOUR WORRIES ABOUT WORRYING! 
 
An investigation into the cognitive correlates of worry 
 
 
 
STOP JE GEPIEKER OVER PIEKEREN! 
 
Een onderzoek naar de cognitieve correlaten van piekeren 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de 
rector magnificus  
Prof. Dr. S.W.J. Lamberts 
en volgens het besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
 
 
donderdag 2 november 2006 
om 16.00 uur 
 
 
 
 
door 
 
Gwendolijn Olivia de Bruin 
Geboren te Wijk bij Duurstede 
Promotiecommissie 
 
 
Promotoren:  Prof.dr. P.E.H.M. Muris 
Prof.dr. H.T. van de Molen 
 
Overige leden:  Prof.dr A.R. Arntz 
Prof.dr J.E.J.M. Hovens 
   Dr. I.F.A Franken 
 
Copromotor:  Mr.dr. E. Rassin 
 CONTENTS 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION        
 
7 
2 PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF A DUTCH VERSION OF THE 
INTOLERANCE OF UCERTAINTY SCALE 
 
 
29 
3 WORRYING IN THE LAB: DOES INTOLERANCE OF 
UNCERTAINTY HAVE PREDICTIVE VALUE? 
 
 
41 
4 META-COGNITIONS IN RELATION TO WORRY AND 
OBSESSIONS 
 
 
55 
5 THE PREDICTION OF WORRY IN NON-CLINICAL INDIVIDUALS: 
THE ROLE OF INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY, META-
WORRY, AND NEUROTICISM 
 
 
 
77 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
93 
 SAMENVATTING 
 
107 
 DANKWOORD 
 
113 
 CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
117 
 
 
 

 INTRODUCTION 
 

Introduction 
Worrying is such a commonplace experience for most people, that specifying what worry 
actually is seems almost unnecessary. However, in this introduction it will be made clear that 
worry is a complex way of dealing with (future) threat. The awareness that in the future 
possible negative events may occur, enables us to consider possible solutions to prepare for 
the right action. Obviously, this reaction is not an ad hoc response like that of an animal that 
displays fight or flight behavior when confronted with a frightening stimulus. However, the 
perception of an excessive amount of possible harmful events seems to facilitate the need to 
prepare our mind and body for all possibilities, and in effect makes us live many lives. As 
theses “lives” are only lived in our minds, a real safety signal that indicates that we will be 
able to handle the future problem and thus satisfies our need for certainty and disclosure is 
never reached (Woody & Rachman, 1994).  
Before Borkovec started with his seminal work on worry, the construct of worry was 
only known in studies concerned with test anxiety. In this research domain a distinction was 
made between the cognitive component of test anxiety, that is worry, and the more 
emotional, physiological reactions of anxiety (see Spielberger, 1980). At the end of the 
previous century, Borkovec and his research group shifted their attention from insomnia 
research to worry (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). This early work of 
Borkovec can be seen as the starting point of what is nowadays known about worry. Back in 
1983, Borkovec posited a definition of worry that has been cited frequently. He defined worry 
as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable. 
The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an issue 
whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes” 
(Borkovec et al., 1983; p. 10). Furthermore, according to Borkovec worry should be 
regarded as an immediate cognitive avoidance response to aversive images (Borkovec & 
Inz, 1990). The aversive images of events in the future are perceived as possibly 
threatening, and enhance uncertainty. The avoidant reaction that is provided by worrying is 
thought to minimize cardiovascular responses to the threatening images. Further, worry 
would prepare people for the worst, help them to avoid feeling anxious, and distract 
individuals from even more emotional or negatively affect-laden topics (Borkovec, Ray, & 
Stöber, 1998). Thus, worry functions in a way that enables individuals to cope with anxiety. 
 However, worry may also have clear disadvantageous features. That is, worry can 
be experienced as intrusive and is repetitive in nature. This is because worry is frequently 
concerned with finding solutions for problems that might take place in the future. As it often 
remains unknown whether the right solutions are considered, confirmation to stop the 
worrying is lacking. Furthermore, as the future is full with possible negative events, reasons 
to stop worrying are indeed often lacking; hence worrying can become intrusive and 
repetitive. 
 
Worry and other forms of intrusive thought patterns 
Uncontrollable thought activity is not confined to worry. Repetitive and intrusive thought 
activity is present in various forms of psychopathology such as anxiety, depression and 
obsessions (see Borkovec et al., 1983). Clark and Rhyno (2005) define intrusive thoughts, 
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images or impulses as: “any distinct, identifiable cognitive event that is unwanted, 
unintended, and recurrent. It interrupts the flow of thought, interferes in task performance, is 
associated with negative affect, and is difficult to control” (p. 4). As the symptoms of anxiety, 
depression and obsession show similarities and are often related to worry, these constructs 
will be addressed briefly before discussing worry in more detail.  
 
Anxiety 
Öhman (1993) defines anxiety as a state of undirected arousal following the 
perception of threat. As worry can also be perceived as a reaction to the perception of 
threat, it is not surprising that high levels of anxiety are generally found to be linked to high 
levels of worry (e.g., Davey, 1993; Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2004). However, worry and 
anxiety are distinct constructs and this has been supported by numerous studies. For 
instance, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, and Borkovec (1990) have shown that in a group of anxiety 
disordered patients, the correlation between worry and anxiety is rather low. Furthermore, 
anxiety and worry differed in their relation and their unique contribution to a number of 
variables that are implicated in the etiology of anxiety and worry, such as problem solving 
skills, coping styles, focus of thoughts, emotional control, and negative affect (respectively, 
Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Stöber, 1998; Zebb & Beck, 1998). Finally, a 
number of experimental studies obtained additional evidence for the notion that worry and 
anxiety are different constructs. York, Borkovec, Vasey, and Stern (1987) tested, among 
other issues, whether worry, anxiety and neutral inductions produced differences in levels of 
negative cognitive intrusions. Results showed that the worry induction produced higher 
levels of negative intrusions than did the anxiety induction and the neutral induction. 
Andrews and Borkovec (1988) also used inductions of worry and anxiety; the worry 
induction produced a stronger emotional state than the anxiety induction did. All in all, it 
seems safe to conclude that worry and anxiety are related but nevertheless distinct 
constructs.  
 
Rumination 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) defined rumination as repetitive thoughts focused on 
depressive feelings and the origins of such symptoms. In contrast, worry is concerned with 
repetitive and uncontrollable thoughts about possible future negative events (Borkovec et 
al., 1983), which means that worry and rumination differ with regard to the time-orientation 
and the content of the thoughts. In short, rumination is associated with depression and past 
loss, whereas worry is linked to anxiety and future threat (see Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & 
Craske, 2000). Furthermore, Segerstrom et al. (2000) pose that thought content, and not the 
thought process (i.e., repetitive thought), discriminates the two forms (see also Watkins, 
2004). Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, and Heimberg (2002) draw a similar conclusion on 
the basis of a factor analysis. Worry and rumination items were found to load on separate 
but correlated factors and so the conclusion was justified that they represent closely allied 
but distinct constructs (see also Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004). 
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Obsessions 
Obsessions constitute another category of intrusive thoughts. Obsessions can be 
defined as persistent and recurrent ideas, thoughts, impulses or images that are 
experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress (see 
DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In reaction to an obsession, a person 
can develop a compulsion; an act that functions to neutralize the anxiety caused by the 
obsession (Taylor, 2002). Although the compulsions reduce discomfort, they can become 
disruptive of daily life routines in a dysfunctional manner (see DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Obsessions and worry are the main symptoms of two closely 
allied anxiety disorders, namely obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and generalized 
anxiety disorders (GAD). Both represent repetitive cognitive intrusions that are difficult to 
dismiss and to control, and can be found in both clinical and non-clinical populations, 
although the frequency of these intrusive thoughts distinguishes clinical from non-clinical 
manifestations (Brown, Dowdall, Côté, & Barlow, 1994; Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
2000a; Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000b). Wells and Morrison (1994) conducted 
research in a normal sample and found that worry was more verbally oriented, more 
distracting, and less involuntary than obsessions. In a review by Turner, Beidel, and Stanley 
(1992), the similarities and differences between worry and obsessions were carefully 
analyzed. These authors conclude that although there is some overlap, the two constructs 
clearly differ on various dimensions. In comparison to obsessions, worry is concerned with 
daily life experiences instead of themes of dirt and contamination, worry is more often 
regarded as ego-syntonic and although both forms are experienced as uncontrollable, worry 
is resisted less strongly. In conclusion, despite clear similarities, worry and obsessions can 
be differentiated on several dimensions. 
 
From normal to pathological worry 
In sum, worry refers to the anticipation and/or avoidance of a negative outcome of a 
situation through pondering about possible solutions. This primarily verbal/linguistic activity 
results in the suppression of physical symptoms of fear and as such may be regarded as 
useful in the short-term. Worry is also associated with and initiated by feelings of anxiety. 
These feelings of anxiety may prompt the person to avoid the feared, future event 
altogether, instantly delivering further relief. However, a person who worries frequently 
overestimates the possibility of the occurrence of negative events (see Aikins & Craske, 
2001); the chance that the negative event will actually happen is often rather low. So 
besides the preoccupation with worry, a person continuously avoids presumed future 
threats, and thus does not learn to employ adequate coping strategies. As life is full of 
ambiguous and negative events, frequent worry activity may loose its adaptive function of 
providing solutions for possible future problems, consequently creating prolonged states of 
anxiety and resulting in a significant disturbance of normal functioning (Borkovec et al., 
1998). 
Excessive worry and anxiety are the main features of GAD. Since 1987, GAD is no 
longer considered as a residual category for anxiety disorders in the DSM but is officially 
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accepted as a disorder. People with GAD often find it hard to cope with life and the constant 
distress and anxiety caused by the uncontrollable worrying. GAD often has its onset during 
adolescence, and it is thought that approximately 5% of the population suffers from GAD at 
one point in their lives. The disorder is persistent in nature and spontaneous recovery is 
infrequent (see American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Although patients with GAD 
experience their worrying as uncontrollable and causing significant anxiety, they still feel that 
there are positive features about worry that outweigh the negative sides and that worry helps 
them to deal with life in general. Davey (1994) describes high levels of anxiety, negative 
cognitions and catastrophising as examples of dysfunctional features of pathological 
worrying. These features can aggravate the individual’s problems and negative mood.  
Ruscio (2002) set out to investigate the differences between worry in GAD patients 
and worry in a group of high-worriers that did not meet the criteria for GAD. Ruscio (2002; p. 
393) drew a tentative conclusion: “the boundary between normal worry and GAD may be 
quantitative, [the results] also indicate that GAD is not synonymous with severe worry and 
that characteristics of one may not necessarily generalize to the other”.  
However, in other studies (e.g., Mennin et al., 2004), it has been suggested that 
non-pathological and pathological worry do not differ in content but do so in terms of 
prevalence and severity, which seems to imply that the two forms of worry are positioned on 
a continuum. Ruscio, Borkovec, and Ruscio (2001) also examined whether the difference 
between normal and pathological worry is one of “degree or kind”. First of all, they noted that 
normal and pathological worriers worry about similar topics, but pathological worriers worry 
about more topics (including worry about minor things), spend more time on worrying, and 
experience the worrying as more uncontrollable. Via taxometric procedures, Ruscio and 
colleagues also found support for the dimensionality (“degree”) of worry. This conception is 
echoed in numerous investigations on the construct of worry, which employed both clinical 
and non-clinical subjects and often obtained similar results (see also Sexton, Norton, 
Walker, & Norton, 2003 for a similar reasoning). 
More importantly, Ruscio et al. (2001) argue that theories that set out to explain 
how and why worry becomes pathological “must move beyond factors associated with the 
presence or absence of pathological worry [and should] consider causal and maintenance 
factors associated with varying levels of worry severity within the full range of worry 
presentations” (p. 418). Accordingly, what makes a person worry and what makes the levels 
of worry move from normal to pathological? 
 
Cognitive models 
Mathews (1990) puts forward three possible mechanisms: (1) people may vary in their 
sensitivity to signals of threat, (2) individuals who worry excessively may select the more 
threatening interpretation of signals that are ambiguous, and therefore prepare more often 
for threatening events and, (3) intrusive thoughts about aversive outcomes reflect 
differences in the way in which information about danger is stored in long term memory. This 
last possibility emerged from the work of Eysenck (1985) and the network theory of mood 
and memory of Bower (1981). That is, highly anxious individuals might store (more) danger 
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information in tight clusters, quickly having more threatening information at hand when 
experiencing possible threat. As mentioned by Mathews (1990), these possibilities are far 
from exhaustive. Several newer models that focus on what causes worry and what makes 
normal worry become pathological will be discussed in short next. 
For instance, the model of Krohne (1993) proposes that individuals can be 
differentiated by the way they cope with threatening information that contains aversive 
and/or ambiguous stimuli. Individuals can cope by intensified processing of threatening 
information, “vigilance”, or they can turn away from threat related to stimuli, that is, cognitive 
avoidance. Krohne (1993) states that predominantly aversive stimuli elicit somatic arousal. 
The experience of somatic arousal is postulated to lead to cognitive avoidant behavior, as 
an attempt to control the fear. The ambiguous nature of the situation provokes (emotional) 
uncertainty. The experience of uncertainty could enhance coping behavior via vigilance, that 
is, worry and anxiety. This model seems a prelude of another model that is central to this 
thesis (i.e., “Intolerance of Uncertainty”). 
Furthermore, Beck and Clark (1997) discuss an elaborated schema-based 
information-processing model directed at explaining an individual’s vulnerability to anxiety 
disorders. The model proposes (faulty) automatic and strategic processing in reaction to 
anticipated or actual negative life events. In short, the incoming information is distorted, 
resulting in an overestimation of threat (capturing most of the attentional resources), which 
in turn leads to an underestimation of one’s own coping resources, and finally an overuse of 
protective strategies such as worry. 
In continuation of these cognitive models, several cognitive biases pertaining to 
threat that are involved in anxiety and worry can be identified. The biases are in the domain 
of (1) attention: a person is sensitive to cues signaling possible future threats, subsequently 
occupying disproportionate amounts of attention, (2) interpretation: ambiguous events are 
primarily interpreted in an emotional and threatening manner, and (3) memory: a negative 
mood (arising from anxiety that is provoked by ambiguous signals) facilitates easy storage 
as well as easy retrieval of threat-related information, which in turn elevates anxious feelings 
even more (see for instance Aikins & Craske, 2001; Eysenck, 1992; and MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 2004 for a detailed description, and reviews).  
Even more recently, out of a range of “second generation” cognitive behavioral 
accounts that extended Beck’s model (see Riskind, 2005), two models for worry and GAD 
appear especially promising (see Heimberg, Turk, & Mennin, 2004). These two models that 
concentrate on (1) intolerance of uncertainty, and (2) meta-worry, are the main focus of this 
thesis. 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
A research group originating from Canada developed a model to explain worry and 
GAD. In this model, intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has a central role. This construct was 
postulated earlier by Krohne (1993) but somewhat differed from the concept of intolerance of 
uncertainty that is put forward here (see Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005). Ladouceur, 
Talbot, and Dugas (1997) define IU as: “the way an individual perceives information in 
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ambiguous situations and responds to this information with a set of cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioural reactions” (p. 356). These reactions are negative and independent of the 
probability of the actual occurrence of the situation and the associated consequences 
(Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Thus, people who are intolerant of uncertainty worry 
frequently about what could possibly happen because they are sensitive to ambiguous 
information and events (e.g., interpretation bias) and because they have strong reactions to 
these situations, frequently asking themselves “What if …?” questions, and engaging in 
catastrophising about what might happen.  
The construct of intolerance of uncertainty is measured by the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), which 
measures “emotional, cognitive and behavioural reactions to ambiguous situations, 
implications of being uncertain, and attempts to control the future” (p. 791; Freeston et al., 
1994). The original French version and the translated English version both exhibit 
satisfactory psychometric properties (see Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston et al., 1994). A recent study by Norton (2005) demonstrated that 
the cross-cultural psychometric properties of the IUS were also good and highly similar for 
four ethnic groups in the United States (i.e., African American, Caucasian, Hispanic/Latino, 
and Southeast Asian). 
Research conducted on the relation between IU and worry has delivered promising 
results. For example, Freeston et al. (1994) and Dugas et al. (1997) have demonstrated 
that, independent of levels anxiety and depression, there is a link between IU and worry. 
Furthermore, IU discriminated non-clinical subjects who clearly show the symptoms of GAD 
from non-clinical subjects who do not display such symptoms (Freeston et al., 1994). The 
construct of IU was also able to distinguish between GAD patients and non-clinical worriers 
(Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998). Finally, it has been demonstrated that GAD 
patients display higher levels of IU than patients with other anxiety disorders (Ladouceur et 
al., 1999). However, there is some debate about the ability of IU to make a distinction 
between various anxiety disorders. For example, Holaway, Heimberg, and Coles (2006) 
found that individuals with analogue GAD and OCD (as measured by means of 
questionnaires) displayed similar levels of IU. Similarly, Deacon, Kalsy, Whiteside, 
Schwartz, Moore, and Abramowitz (2003) found that patients with GAD, OCD and social 
phobia patients portrayed similar levels of IU. 
Next to IU, the model that was constructed by Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, and 
Freeston (1998) contains three other main features (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The conceptual model of GAD by Dugas and colleagues. 
Based on: Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., and Freeston, M. H. (1998). 
Generalized anxiety disorder: A preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 36, 215-226.  
 
First, the model is set against a background of high levels of IU. In short, if individuals exhibit 
high levels of IU, this can exacerbate the “What if …?” questions that initiate anxiety and 
worry. Second, according to the model, both negative and positive beliefs about the 
usefulness of worry contribute to levels of worry. In comparison to moderate worriers, GAD 
patients think that worrying is more useful in reaching solutions for problems and in 
preventing negative outcomes (Ladouceur et al., 1998). Furthermore, findings by Davey, 
Tallis, and Capuzzo (1996) are consistent with the idea that dysfunctional positive and 
negative beliefs about the consequences of worrying are related to pathological worrying. 
Wells (1995) also underscores the influence of rigid positive beliefs which motivate the 
(over)reliance on worry and negative beliefs (i.e., appraisal) about the usefulness and 
controllability of worry. The third feature of the model is poor problem orientation. Problem 
orientation refers to how people perceive their own problem solving ability, and meta-
cognitive beliefs such as awareness, appraisal, emotional reactions and control strategies to 
problems encountered in everyday life (Dugas et al., 1998). Dugas et al. (1997) found that 
emotional problem solving and IU make unique contributions to worry. Both positive 
(focused information seeking) and negative (focusing on threat) orientation are related to 
worry, although no difference between non-clinical moderate worriers and GAD patients 
appeared on problem solving skills (Ladouceur et al., 1998). The fourth and final feature that 
is identified in this model is the process variable of cognitive avoidance. As mentioned 
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earlier, Borkovec posed that worry is a strategy to cope with mental images of threatening or 
disturbing future events (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). More specifically, Borkovec and Lyonfields 
(1993) found that somatic reactions on fearful imagery decrease as a result of worrying. 
Thus, this semantic cognitive activity can be viewed as a way of cognitive avoidance. 
Cognitive avoidance is also utilized as a dysfunctional manner of reducing distressing 
thoughts (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), thus further aggravating the negative 
outcomes of worry. Finally, the study of Dugas et al. (1998) shows that all the process 
variables together (IU, beliefs about worry, poor problem orientation and cognitive 
avoidance) correctly discriminated as much as 82% of GAD patients from a non-clinical 
group. IU was the most important variable in explaining group differences.  
Summarizing, the relation between IU and worry is well established. However, 
because of this close relation (see for instance Dugas et al. (1997) who reported a 
correlation of .70, and Freeston et al. (1994) who reported a correlation of .63) and the fact 
that both worry and IU refer to negative events, one might suggest that worry and IU are not 
distinct constructs. However, when keeping the definitions in mind, it is clear that worry 
refers to a mental reaction to a (possible) negative event in the future, whereas IU is the 
manifestation of a cognitive filter, in which an individual displays a low tolerance for the 
possibility that a negative event might happen. As such, “worry might best be seen as a 
product of IU” (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004; p. 146). Furthermore, to disentangle the 
close relationship between worry and IU, a small number of experimental studies have been 
conducted. For instance, Ladouceur et al. (1997) investigated the relation between individual 
differences in IU and doubting behaviour, that is, participants’ performance during a task 
with varying levels (low, moderate and high) of ambiguity. Results showed that participants 
who scored high on the IUS, needed more information before coming to a decision in the 
moderately ambiguous task. This effect was not observed during the high and non-
ambiguous tasks. This led Ladouceur et al. (1997) to conclude that individuals who are 
highly intolerant of uncertainty, under certain conditions, “have a lower threshold for the 
perception of ambiguity than other individuals” (p. 361) and that this lower threshold could 
lead to worry. Furthermore, results showed that although IU and the worry measure Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) were related, the PSWQ 
nevertheless did not correlate to any of the task variables, which led the authors to conclude 
that “IU and trait worry are not only related but clearly distinct constructs” (Ladouceur et al., 
1997; p. 362). 
Next, Ladouceur et al. (2000) manipulated levels of IU to investigate the possible 
effects on worry. In this study, the level of IU was manipulated by providing participants 
instructions that contained information on the probability (low or high) of winning the 
(required) money in a computerized roulette game. Objective chances of winning were in 
fact determined by the computer and in actuality equal for all participants. Results indicated 
that participants in the increased IU group showed more worry as compared to participants 
who experienced a decreased level of IU. Thus, in this study, IU was successfully 
manipulated which resulted in changes of worry levels, thereby providing further evidence 
for the notion that IU is central to worry.  
16 
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In sum, the research so far shows that levels of intolerance of uncertainty are 
positively related to levels of worry and GAD. However, the specificity of the concept of IU 
for GAD is not unequivocal and more experimental research is needed to explicate the 
relation between levels of intolerance of uncertainty and levels of state and trait worry 
(Dugas et al., 2004). 
 
Meta-cognition 
The second promising “second generation” cognitive account for worry is the model 
that pivots around meta-worry. Beck and Clark (1997) already mentioned a “meta-cognitive 
mode”, or thinking about thinking, in their information-processing model. This elaborative 
strategic processing is initiated in the view of threat, in order to evaluate one’s own coping 
resources (see “Cognitive models”). In response to this meta-cognitive reflection on threat, 
anxiety may decline (through better insight in the situation and one’s coping resources or 
through initiated avoidance of threat) or increase (by continued preoccupation with the 
threat). Meta-cognition can be defined as “stable knowledge or beliefs about one’s cognitive 
system and knowledge about factors that affect the functioning of the system; the regulation 
and awareness of the current state of cognition, and appraisal of the significance of thoughts 
and memories” (Wells, 1995; p. 302). Wells posited the Self-Regulatory Executive Function 
model (S-REF model; Wells & Matthews, 1996; Wells, 2002), in which newer 
understandings about meta-cognition are incorporated in the information-processing model 
of Beck. This multilevel model enables a better implementation and execution of cognitive 
therapy for a range of psychological disorders. The S-REF model states that meta-cognitive 
beliefs “concerning perseverative thinking processes should underlie both types (depressive 
and anxious) of mental act” (Wells, 2000; p. 156). Wells continued to emphasize the 
importance of meta-cognition, and in particular meta-worry, in relation to worry and GAD. In 
this cognitive account for worry and GAD, Wells (1994) distinguishes two worry dimensions, 
namely a content dimension and a process dimension. The first dimension of worry (type 1 
worry) concerns worry about external events or internal, non-cognitive events such as 
concerns about one’s health or social functioning. The second dimension (type 2 worry) 
comprehends “worrying about worry, appraising negative thoughts as uncontrollable, and 
reflecting a desire to control thoughts” (Wells, 1995; p. 304; Wells, 2004). Type 1 occurs 
when a stimulus is interpreted as possibly threatening (triggering the “What if...” question) 
and is initiated because the individual holds positive meta-beliefs about the function and 
effects of worry as a problem solving or coping strategy. However, extensive worrying can 
be interpreted as uncontrollable. Furthermore, external information about frequent worrying 
and social learning can lead to negative meta-beliefs about type 1 worry (Wells, 2005), and 
hence type 2 worry is initiated. This type 2 worry, the negative appraisal of the process and 
consequences of worry, is thought to be central to GAD (Wells, 2002).  
The two types of worry can be measured by means of the Anxious Thoughts 
Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994). This self-report questionnaire possesses good psychometric 
properties. The research concerned with testing the validity of the meta-cognitive model of 
Wells was initially carried out with the AnTI. In later work, Wells (2005) developed the 
17 
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measure Meta-Worry Questionnaire (MWQ), that specifically assesses the frequency and 
beliefs about meta-worry, and thus focuses on the perceived dangers accompanying worry, 
thereby incorporating the DSM-IV criteria for GAD. To date, no studies using this 
questionnaire have been published.  
According to the meta-cognitive model, type 1 and type 2 worry may have several 
negative consequences for the person’s functioning. These negative consequences are 
included in Wells’ model. Firstly, there is a reciprocal relation between type 1 worry and 
emotion. Worry can diminish anxiety, when a felt sense of “I can handle the situation” is 
reached and worry maintains its functional role. But as has become clear from the earlier 
sections in this chapter, worry can also aggravate levels of anxiety, thereby having a 
negative impact on the emotional state of the individual, which in turn could increase the 
subjective need to worry even more (Wells, 2000). Secondly, when type 2 worry is activated, 
it has detrimental effects in three domains (see Figure 2). Type 2 worry can affect behaviour 
in such a way that individuals choose to avoid the threat, certain situations or information. 
This results in postponement of dealing with the anxious stimuli and alternative coping 
strategies are not initiated. The negative appraisal of frequent worrying also strengthens the 
feeling of loss of control, which can activate thought suppression as a coping strategy 
(thought control). However, (as mentioned earlier), thought suppression may be a 
counterproductive strategy, resulting in even higher levels of worry and as such contributing 
to the development of GAD (see Purdon, 1999; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wegner et al., 
1987). The failure of this coping strategy reinforces the feeling of the uncontrollability of 
worry. In sum, Wells poses that meta-worry “could reflect a reciprocally incremental 
relationship between unwanted cognition and cognitive-behavioural attempts to suppress 
such cognition” (Wells, 1994; p. 297). The somatic and cognitive symptoms that result from 
worrying, can be interpreted as an indication that the person has no control over the 
worrying, and thus the negative beliefs about worry are strengthened and the emotional 
state further deteriorates (emotion) (Wells, 2000; Wells, 2004). 
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Figure 2. The cognitive model of GAD by Wells and Carter. 
Based on: Wells, A., and Carter, K. (1999). Preliminary tests of a cognitive model of 
generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 585-594.  
 
So, when type 1 worry becomes too frequent, and this ongoing worrying is 
increasingly evaluated in a negative way, type 2 worry (meta-worry) is initiated. This 
cognitive construct is thought to transform normal worry into pathological worry. A study by 
Wells and Carter (1999) demonstrated that problematic worrying in non-clinical participants 
was indeed related to meta-worry, and that this link was independent of trait anxiety and 
content (type 1) worry. Davis and Valentiner (2000) found that participants who met the 
criteria for GAD, displayed significantly higher levels of meta-worry, in comparison to non-
anxious and non-worried anxious participants. Further research has demonstrated that 
patients with GAD displayed significant higher levels of meta-worry than patients with panic 
disorder, social phobia and depression (Wells & Carter, 2001).  
Additional support for the model was obtained in research on more general meta-
cognitive beliefs and appraisals, which are also thought to be related to other forms of 
psychopathology, such as OCD (e.g., Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Purdon & 
Clark, 1999; Wells, 1995). Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) constructed a self-report 
measure to assess “individual differences in positive and negative beliefs about worry and 
intrusive thoughts, metacognitive monitoring and judgements of cognitive efficiency” (Wells, 
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2000; p. 111). This Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) consists of five dimensions, 
namely positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about the controllability of thoughts and 
corresponding danger, cognitive confidence, negative beliefs about thoughts in general 
including themes of superstition, punishment and responsibility, and cognitive self-
consciousness. Research with the MCQ has yielded promising results. Cartwright-Hatton 
and Wells (1997) found that the MCQ dimensions correlated with anxiety, worry (both type 1 
and type 2), and obsessional symptoms. Worry was predicted by positive beliefs about 
worry, negative beliefs about the controllability of thoughts and corresponding danger, and 
cognitive confidence. Wells and Papageorgiou (1998) replicated these findings, that is, the 
MCQ dimensions correlated with obsessional symptoms and worry. Regression analyses 
showed that positive beliefs about worry and beliefs concerning uncontrollability and danger 
predicted worry. Davis and Valentiner (2000) demonstrated that participants who fulfilled the 
criteria for GAD displayed significantly higher scores on all MCQ scales than a nonanxious 
group, and differed on four of the five dimensions in comparison to a nonworried anxious 
group. Wells and Carter (2001) also showed that GAD patients scored higher on the 
negative meta-cognition scales concerned with uncontrollability and danger in comparison to 
patients with panic disorder, social phobia, depression and non-patients, even when general 
levels of worry were controlled. Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) developed a short form 
of the MCQ. The subscale “negative beliefs about thoughts in general including themes of 
superstition, punishment and responsibility” was replaced by “beliefs about need to control 
thoughts”. Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) again found the expected correlations 
between the subscales and measures of worry, anxiety and obsessional symptoms.  
In conclusion, there is evidence for the tenability of the cognitive model of Wells 
(1995) from two lines of research, one concentrating on meta-worry and the second 
concentrating on more general meta-cognitive beliefs and appraisal. However, the latter line 
of research is not specific for worry, but also pertains to meta-cognitive processes involved 
in OCD (see for instance Davis & Valentiner, 2000; Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999; Gwilliam 
et al., 2004; Purdon & Clark, 1999). More specifically, the dimension “cognitive self-
consciousness” (CSC), which refers to the excessive tendency to be aware of, and monitor 
one’s thinking (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) has received additional attention in 
distinguishing OCD from GAD. In the study of Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997), only CSC 
differentiated OCD patients from GAD patients, with the former group showing significantly 
higher levels of cognitive self-consciousness. Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, and Heffelfinger 
(2003) replicated this finding, comparing an OCD group with a group of anxiety disordered 
patients. Cohen and Calamari (2004) found that CSC and intrusive thought appraisal are 
predictors of OCD symptoms and stated that CSC appears to be distinguishable from the 
(negative) appraisal of intrusive thoughts. Finally, CSC seems to be the starting point of 
thought salience and the negative appraisal of intrusive thoughts (Marker, Calamari, 
Woodard, & Riemann, in press). 
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Thesis outline 
This thesis focuses on the cognitive concepts of intolerance of uncertainty and meta-worry, 
and sets out to gain further insight into the tenability of these two dysfunctional cognitions in 
their relation to symptoms of worry.  
In Chapter 2, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale was translated into Dutch and 
the psychometric properties of this translation were reexamined. A factor analysis was 
performed to explore the possible underlying factor structure. Furthermore, the internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent validity were assessed (“Psychometric 
properties of a Dutch version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale”).  
In Chapter 3, a study is presented that investigated whether individual differences 
in IU have predictive value for state worry, in response to experimental situations that are 
either high or low in uncertainty. The two experimental situations that were devised to elicit 
the different levels of uncertainty consisted of completing a partly unsolvable intelligence 
task and an IQ task that actually varied in level of difficulty. The aforementioned outline 
showed that the grounding studies for the IU model of GAD have relied heavily on self-report 
questionnaires. Little experimental research has been conducted on the causal relation 
between IU and worry. Therefore, this study further examines the empirical tenability of the 
IU model of GAD via experimental research (“Worrying in the lab: Does intolerance of 
uncertainty have predictive value?”) 
In Chapter 4, two studies investigated the relations between being aware of one’s 
own thoughts (CSC) and the negative appraisal of worry (meta-worry) on the one hand, and 
symptoms of worry and obsessional thought on the other. The literature is unclear on how 
these two concepts relate to each other, and subsequently to different types of intrusive 
thoughts, that is, worry and obsessional thoughts (“Cognitive Self-Consciousness and meta-
worry and their relations to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts”). Although the 
study relied on a small sample, the results suggested that meta-worry might be more 
important for understanding excessive, intrusive thought patterns, more so than cognitive 
self-consciousness. This preliminary finding was further explored (“Are there specific meta-
cognitions associated with vulnerability to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts?”). 
The meta-cognitive concept of suppression (the conscious attempts to avoid unwanted 
thoughts) was also included in this study, as heightened levels of monitoring one’s own 
thoughts and the negative appraisal of thoughts could relate to frequent efforts of thought 
suppression, which in turn could influence levels of worry and obsessional thoughts.  
In Chapter 5, the concluding study attempted to test the relative contributions of the 
main two cognitive constructs intolerance of uncertainty and meta-worry to symptoms of 
worry. In this study, the relation between intolerance of uncertainty, meta-worry, and 
neuroticism on the one hand, and worry on the other hand was investigated. Worry was 
operationalized in two different ways: as trait worry and as idiosyncratic worry. Neuroticism 
was included as a feasible general vulnerability factor of worry (“The prediction of worry in 
non-clinical individuals: The role of intolerance of uncertainty, meta-worry, and neuroticism”). 
Finally, in Chapter 6 the main findings, limitations, and future directions are 
summarized and discussed.  
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Chapter 2 
Abstract 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is thought to play a key role in the development and 
maintenance of worry and generalized anxiety disorder. The present study investigated the 
psychometric properties of the Dutch translation of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(IUS), the most frequently employed scale for measuring IU. The factor analysis of the IUS 
pointed in the direction of a one-factor solution. Furthermore, the Dutch IUS portrayed 
excellent internal consistency and test re-test reliability. Tests of construct validity showed 
that the Dutch IUS correlated significantly stronger with worry than with depression. The 
regression analysis demonstrated that IU contributed significantly to worry, after controlling 
for demographic variables and levels of anxiety and depression. In addition, it was 
demonstrated that the IUS successfully discriminated between patients with GAD and other 
anxiety disorders, and non-clinical participants. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that the 
Dutch IUS is a reliable and valid scale for assessing IU.  
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Introduction 
Since Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is no longer considered as a residual category in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 1987), this disorder and its main feature of worry have been the focus of considerable 
research attention. One line of research aims at explaining the development and 
maintenance of worry and GAD by means of a concept known as intolerance of uncertainty 
(IU). In their frequently cited paper, Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, and DePree (1983) 
define worry as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-
solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more 
negative outcomes” (p. 10; Borkovec et al., 1983). This definition makes clear that the 
aspect of uncertainty is one of the key elements of this anxiety phenomenon. Freeston, 
Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, and Ladouceur (1994) introduced the construct of IU, which can 
be described as “the predisposition to react negatively to an uncertain event or situation, 
independent of its probability of occurrence and of its associated consequences” (p. 934; 
Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Briefly, people who are characterized by high levels 
of IU experience many ambiguous situations of everyday life as stressful and fearful, which 
means that they are also “generating dysfunctional emotional states (i.e. worrying), inhibiting 
problem focused behaviour, and requiring high degrees of evidence before a decision can 
be made” (p. 792; Freeston et al., 1994). In this way, IU is thought to contribute to worry and 
GAD. 
Research on the relation between IU and worry has yielded promising results. For 
example, Freeston et al. (1994) have demonstrated that there is a unique link between IU 
and worry, which is independent of levels of anxiety and depression. Furthermore, in the 
non-clinical population, IU discriminated subjects who clearly show the symptoms of GAD 
from those who do not display such symptoms (Freeston et al., 1994). Similar results have 
been obtained in studies involving clinical patients. That is, IU was found to distinguish 
between GAD patients and non-clinical worriers (Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 
1998), and it has been demonstrated that GAD patients display higher levels of IU than 
patients with other anxiety disorders (Ladouceur et al., 1999). Although these findings seem 
to indicate that IU is specifically related to worry and GAD, it should be noted that research 
is still inconclusive on this point as there is little empirical research on this issue, and there 
are indications that this characteristic is also relevant for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006).  
Most studies on IU have employed the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; 
(Freeston et al., 1994), which intends to measure “emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
reactions to ambiguous situations, implications of being uncertain, and attempts to control 
the future” (Freeston et al., 1994). The psychometric properties of the original French 
version of the IUS were examined by Freeston et al. (1994) and Dugas, Freeston, and 
Ladouceur (1997). Their studies demonstrated that the IUS displays good internal 
consistency (α = .91) and test-retest reliability over a five-week period (r = .78). Furthermore, 
factor analysis revealed a five-factor structure with factors related to the following themes: 
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(1) uncertainty is unacceptable and should be avoided, (2) being uncertain reflects badly on 
a person, (3) frustration related to uncertainty, (4) uncertainty causes stress, and (5) 
uncertainty prevents action. Finally, correlations between the IUS and measures for 
symptoms of worry, depression and anxiety ranged between .52 and .63, which 
demonstrates that the questionnaire has satisfactory convergent validity (Dugas et al., 1997; 
Freeston et al., 1994).  
The reliability and validity of the English translation of the IUS were investigated by 
Buhr and Dugas (2002). Again, internal consistency (α = .94) and test-retest reliability (r = 
.74) were good. However, this time the factor analysis yielded a four-factor structure. The 
four factors were labeled as follows: (1) uncertainty leads to the inability to act, (2) 
uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, (3) unexpected events are negative and should be 
avoided, and (4) being uncertain about the future is unfair. According to Buhr and Dugas 
(2002) this factor structure captures the essence of the IUS better than the five-factor 
structure as reported by Freeston et al. (1994), although the authors also noted that it may 
be preferable to use the total score of the scale. Buhr and Dugas (2002) also provided 
further support for the validity of the IUS as they demonstrated that the IUS was more 
convincingly linked to worry as compared to depression and anxiety. Furthermore, the 
relation between IUS and worry remained significant when controlling for gender, age, and 
the influence of anxiety and depression.  
A final study by Norton (2005) examined the psychometric properties of the IUS in 
four ethnic groups in the United States (i.e., African American, Caucasian, Hispanic/Latino, 
and Southeast Asian) to assess the cross-cultural validity of the questionnaire. Results 
showed that the reliability and validity were good and highly similar for all groups. However, 
exploratory factor analysis of the IUS across the various groups did not yield a consistent 
solution. That is, for each of the groups a somewhat different factor structure emerged, 
many items did not load uniquely on a single factor, and the factors were difficult to interpret. 
Furthermore, as in the Buhr and Dugas study (2002), the factors were found to correlate 
substantially, which points in the direction of a one-factor solution and seems to indicate that 
IU can best be seen as an unidimensional construct. Thus, the results justify Buhr and 
Dugas’ as well as Norton’s recommendation to employ the total score when using the IUS. 
Altogether, research so far has yielded considerable evidence for the psychometric 
qualities of the IUS. As IU is increasingly acknowledged as an important cognitive factor 
playing a role in the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders such as GAD, researchers from all 
over the world are interested in using the IUS. The current study offers information 
concerning the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the IUS in a non-clinical 
sample and provides evidence to show that the translation of the instrument was successful. 
The study also examined some basic theoretical assumptions concerning the links between 
IU, on the one hand, and worry, anxiety, and depression, on the other hand. More 
specifically, we not only tested the factor structure, internal consistency and test re-test 
reliability of the Dutch IUS, but also used the scale to examine whether IU is more 
substantially related to worry than to general (i.e., trait) anxiety and depression. In addition, it 
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was investigated whether the IUS discriminates between patients with GAD and other 
anxiety disorders, and non-clinical participants. 
 
Method 
Sample 
Parts of the data were collected in different studies among psychology students of 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Students received course credits for 
participation. In total, 209 students (168 women and 41 men; mean age = 20.50 years, SD = 
2.51, range 18-34) completed the IUS. One-hundred-and-two of these students (89 women 
and 13 men; mean age = 20.03 years, SD = 2.15, range 18-34) also completed the PSWQ, 
BDI, and STAI. To assess the test-retest reliability of the IUS, a sub-sample of 43 students 
(41 women and 2 men; mean age = 20.04 years, SD = 2.76, range 18-34) completed the 
scale for a second time, four weeks after the initial assessment.  
Furthermore, the study included a group of twenty-three patients (16 women and 7 
men; mean age = 37.34 years, SD = 11.54, range 20-65) from Ensis, an outpatient 
treatment centre in Rotterdam and Spijkenisse, The Netherlands. Certified psychologists 
diagnosed the patients via semi-structured diagnostic interviews, based on DSM-IV-TR 
criteria (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). Fourteen patients met the criteria 
for Generalized Anxiety Disorder, the remainder (n = 9) suffered from other anxiety disorders 
such as OCD, social phobia, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Patients completed the IUS 
(and PSWQ, BDI, and STAI) during the initial assessment at the treatment center. Written 
consent for participation was given. 
 
Measures  
The IUS consists of 27 items (see Table 1). Each item is answered on a five-point 
scale (ranging from 1 = not at all characteristic of me to 5 = entirely characteristic of me). For 
the purpose of this study, the English version of the IUS was translated into Dutch. Next, 
Dutch IUS-items were translated back to English in order to check whether the original 
meaning of the IUS-items was retained. Problem items were scrutinized until agreement on 
their phrasing was reached.  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) taps trait-like worry. The PSWQ consists of 16 items obtaining information about the 
frequency and intensity of worrying (e.g., “Many situations make me worry”). Items are 
answered on a five-point scale (1 = not at all typical of me; 5 = very typical of me). A PSWQ 
total score is calculated by summing the scores on all items after recoding reversed items. 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961) is a 21-item self-report scale for measuring the presence and severity of the main 
symptoms of depression. The items reflect the degree to which respondents experience 
symptoms of depression in the past week (0 = not present; 3 = very much present). Higher 
scores (range: 0-63) indicate higher levels of depression. 
The trait anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) is generally regarded as an index of dispositional anxiety, and 
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consists of 20 items (e.g., “I feel nervous and restless”) that are rated on a four-point scale 
(1 = almost never; 4 = almost always). A total score (range 20-80) can be derived of which 
higher scores are indicative of higher levels of trait anxiety.  
 
Results 
Factor Analysis 
An exploratory principal components factor analysis with Oblimin rotation was 
performed on the 27 items of the IUS (N = 209). Seven factors were found with an 
eigenvalue > 1 (i.e., 7.00, 1.96, 1.75, 1.46, 1.28, 1.16, and 1.05). Following previous factor 
analytic studies of the IUS (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 1994; Norton, 2005), the 
four- and five-factor structure solutions were inspected in detail. However, these solutions 
were not satisfactory (i.e., many secondary loadings, weak factors, and difficult to interpret). 
Therefore, and on the basis of the screeplot, the one-factor solution seemed most justified. 
Table 1 shows the item-total correlations for the 27 items of the IUS.  
 
Table 1. IUS-item total correlations (N = 209). 
No. Item  
1 Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion. .33 
2 Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. .15 
3 Uncertainty makes life intolerable. .32 
4 It’s unfair having no guarantees in life. .45 
5 My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen tomorrow. .65 
6 Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed. .50 
7 Unforeseen events upset me greatly. .69 
8 It frustrates me not having all the information I need. .53 
9 Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life. .55 
10 One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. .39 
11 A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best planning. .51 
12 When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me. .54 
13 Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. .74 
14 When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward. .43 
15 When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well. .47 
16 Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their lives. .61 
17 Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. .53 
18 I always want to know what the future has in store for me. .58 
19 I can’t stand being taken by surprise. .52 
20 The smallest doubt can stop me from acting. .57 
21 I should be able to organize everything in advance. .54 
22 Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. .40 
23 I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure about their future. .62 
24 Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly. .42 
25 I must get away from all uncertain situations. .64 
26 The ambiguities in life stress me. .54 
27 I can’t stand being undecided about my future. .52 
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As can be seen, with the exception of item 2, all items were found to make a clear 
contribution to the total score of the scale. In passing, it should be mentioned that the 
employment of other extraction methods (i.e., maximum likelihood) and/or rotations (i.e., 
varimax) yielded highly similar results. That is, the one-factor structure appeared to provide 
the most clear-cut and parsimonious solution for the IUS. 
 
Internal consistency 
In Table 2 mean scores, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas for the IUS, 
as well as for the other measures (i.e., PSWQ, BDI, and STAI-trait) are displayed for the 
students group, as well as for the patients group. The internal consistency for the Dutch IUS 
was .88 in the student sample, and .94 in the sample of anxiety-disordered patients. All the 
other scales also displayed good internal consistency (α’s between .81 and .94). 
 
Table 2. Mean scores (standard deviations), and Cronbach’s α’s for the IUS and other  
questionnaires. 
 Students Patients 
 Mean (SD) α N Mean (SD) α N 
IUS 65.89 (12.95) .88 209 89.87 (18.51) .94 23 
PSWQ 43.51 (6.43) .92 102 66.96 (8.92) .89 23 
BDI   6.21 (5.32) .81 102 19.75 (7.75) .82 23 
STAI- trait 38.64 (7.65) .88 102 57.74 (7.99) .87 23 
Note. IUS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire,  
BDI: Beck Depression Inventory, STAI-trait: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-trait. 
 
Test-retest reliability 
The test-retest reliability for the IUS over the four-week period appeared 
satisfactory: r = .79 (p < .001), although mean IUS scores slightly decreased from 67.67 (SD 
= 12.78) on occasion 1 to 64.37 (SD = 12.83) on occasion 2 [t(42) = 2.60, p < .05]. 
 
Construct validity 
All questionnaires (i.e., PSWQ, BDI, and STAI-trait) correlated significantly with the 
IUS (see Table 3). The correlation between the IUS and PSWQ was significantly higher than 
the correlation between the IUS and BDI (Z = 1.87, p < .05). The other correlations did not 
differ significantly. 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients between the IUS and the other questionnaires  
(in non-clinical sample). 
 PSWQ BDI STAI-trait 
IUS .61 .46 .50 
PSWQ  .50 .65 
BDI   .68 
Note. IUS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, PSWQ: Penn State Worry  
Questionnaire, BDI: Beck Depression Inventory, STAI-trait: State-Trait  
Anxiety Inventory-trait. All correlations were significant at p < .001 
 
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to determine which variables 
contributed to the prediction of worry (PSWQ). Gender and age were entered on the first 
step, BDI and STAI-trait on the second step, whereas the IUS was entered on the third and 
last step. The results are presented in Table 4 and show that after controlling for 
demographic variables, depression and anxiety, the IUS still accounted for a significant 
additional 4% of variance in PSWQ scores.  
 
Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis to test the predictive value of the  
IUS for worry as indexed by the PSWQ (N = 102). 
Variables R2 ∆R2 B SE B β 
Step 1 .05 .05    
Gender   2.81 3.18 .09 
Age   -.97 .48 -.20* 
Step 2   .46**  .41**    
BDI   .11 .21 .06 
STAI   .82 .14 .61** 
Step 3   .49**  .04**    
IUS   .19 .07 .23* 
Note. PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire, BDI: Beck Depression  
Inventory, STAI-trait: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-trait, IUS: Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
On the PSWQ, BDI, and STAI-trait, scores of the clinical group differed significantly 
from those of the non-clinical group (respectively: t(123) = 5.64, t(123) = 9.57, t(123) = 
11.92; all p’s < .001). As expected, patients displayed higher levels of worry, depression, 
and trait-anxiety as compared to the non-clinical subjects. A t-test was performed to check 
whether the scores on the IUS discriminated between non-clinical participants (N = 209) and 
the group of mixed anxiety patients (N = 23). The results revealed that the latter group 
scored significantly higher on the IUS with a mean score of 89.87 (SD = 18.51), t(230) = 
8.04, p < .001. A further t-test revealed that this difference was not exclusively caused by the 
GAD patients; these patients had a mean IUS score of 90.36 (SD = 16.92) versus 89.11 (SD 
= 21.83) for the other anxiety disorder patients [t(21)<1]. Since the aforementioned 
regression analysis demonstrated that age was a significant predictor of PSWQ scores, an 
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analysis of variance with age entered as a covariate was also conducted. The results 
showed that the effect of group remained significant [F(1,122) = 8.80, p < .01].  
 
Discussion 
Several research groups are examining IU as a possible key factor in the development and 
maintenance of worry and GAD. The present study was set up to investigate the 
psychometric properties of the Dutch translation of the IUS, which is the most frequently 
employed scale for measuring individual differences in IU. The results confirm that the 
psychometric properties of the Dutch IUS are similar to those of the French and English 
versions and seem to demonstrate that the translation was successful. Firstly, factor 
analysis of the IUS pointed in the direction of a one-factor solution, and hence justifies the 
conclusion that IU can best be regarded as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Norton, 2005). 
Therefore, we concur with the recommendation of Buhr and Dugas (2002) to employ the 
total score of the IUS in future research. Secondly, the Dutch version of the IUS was found 
to possess excellent internal consistency and test re-test reliability, which is in keeping with 
results obtained in the previous IUS validation studies (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 
1997; Freeston et al., 1994; Norton, 2005). Thirdly, tests of the construct validity showed 
that the Dutch IUS correlated significantly stronger with worry than with depression. The 
correlation between IUS and trait anxiety and that between IUS and worry were equally 
strong. Furthermore, a regression analysis demonstrated that IU contributed significantly to 
worry, even after controlling for demographic variables and levels of anxiety and depression. 
Again, these results are comparable to previous findings on the convergent and divergent 
validity of the IUS (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 1997; Freeston et al., 1994; Norton, 
2005) and seem to provide further evidence for the notion that the concept of IU is most 
relevant for the study of worry. Finally, the IUS adequately differentiated between a group of 
non-clinical participants and a group of patients with GAD and other anxiety disorders. As 
expected, the clinical group scored significantly higher on the IUS than the group of non-
clinical participants. However, no difference was found between IUS scores of GAD patients 
and patients with other anxiety disorders, and as such the results from Ladouceur et al. 
(1999) were not replicated. However, in our analysis, the patient groups were rather small. 
Future research including larger groups of patients with different anxiety disorders is needed 
to further examine the specificity of IU. 
 Besides the small sample size of our clinical group, two further limitations of the 
present study should be mentioned. The first limitation pertains to the unequal gender 
distribution of the non-clinical group, with a female to male ration of almost 5:1. However, 
the correlation between gender and the IUS was non-significant and gender did not 
contribute significantly to worry. These results are consistent with research of Robichaud, 
Dugas, and Conway (2003) who have demonstrated that IU does not differ between males 
and females, and that there seems to be no differential association between IUS scores and 
worry for both genders. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that reliability and validity 
estimates were affected by the unequal gender distribution of our sample. A second 
limitation of our study is that our non-clinical sample consisted of undergraduate students 
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and therefore the results may not generalize to other populations. Further research with 
other types of community samples should be carried out to replicate the present findings. In 
spite of these shortcomings, it seems safe to conclude that the Dutch version of the IUS is a 
reliable and valid scale for assessing IU, and therefore can be regarded as a useful 
instrument for future research on the role of this cognitive factor in the etiology and 
maintenance of worry and GAD. 
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Chapter 3 
ABSTRACT 
The present article describes two experimental studies investigating whether individual 
differences in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) predict worry in response to uncertain 
situations. In both studies, undergraduate students completed the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Personality and 
Individual Differences, 17, 791-802) and then completed an intelligence task, which was 
thought to elicit feelings of uncertainty. After completing the task, state worry was measured. 
Results of both studies showed that there were positive correlations between IUS-scores 
and task-related state worry. Furthermore, Study 2 showed that individual differences in IU 
only were predictive of worry in a situation that elicits low to medium levels of uncertainty, 
and not in a situation high in uncertainty. Thus, only under certain conditions IU-related 
personality characteristics seem to be predictive of worrisome thoughts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of research concerning worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) has been published in the past years. Worry, which 
is the key feature of GAD, can be defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively 
affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” (p. 10; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 
1983). Different approaches concerning the nature, function, and theoretical underpinnings 
of worry and GAD have been proposed. For instance, in some theories, worry is viewed as a 
way to cope with threatening images (Aikins & Craske, 2001) or as a way to reduce the 
somatic responses of anxiety, thereby lessening the experience of painful emotions 
(Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). However, because accurate problem solving is not applied 
and anxious situations are not adequately tackled, the long-term effects of worry are 
counterproductive and states of anxiety perpetuate. Another theory on worry was provided 
by Wells (1994). His cognitive model of GAD proposes that meta-worrying, the negative 
appraisal of worrying itself, is essential to the development of pathological worrying (see 
also Wells & Carter, 1999). A final theoretical account associates worry with information 
processing biases (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). For example, GAD patients exhibit a 
bias towards negative interpretations of ambiguous situations and react more rapidly to 
threatening cues. Thus, worriers’ thoughts are negatively laden and focused on threats, and 
as a result, anxiety is constantly present.  
Interestingly, Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, and Freeston (1998) developed a model 
in which intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is regarded as the crucial process variable in the 
acquisition and maintenance of severe worry. IU can be described as “the predisposition to 
react negatively to an uncertain event or situation, independent of its probability of 
occurrence and associated consequences” (p. 934; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). 
In short, people with high levels of IU experience many ambiguous situations of everyday life 
as stressful and fearful, and as a result “generate dysfunctional emotional states, inhibit 
problem-focused behaviour, and require high degrees of evidence before a decision can be 
made” (p. 792; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). In this way, IU is 
thought to contribute to worry and GAD. Freeston et al. (1994) developed the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS), a self-report questionnaire for assessing emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioural reactions to ambiguous situations, attempts to control the future, and 
implications of being uncertain. Thereafter, a series of studies has been conducted with this 
measure to investigate IU and its specificity in relation to worry. For example, Dugas, 
Freeston, and Ladouceur (1997) reported that IU (as measured by the IUS) is strongly 
related to trait worry, irrespective of age, sex and mood state. Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, 
and Dugas (1998) demonstrated that the level of IU even discriminates between non-clinical 
subjects who worry regularly and clinically referred patients with GAD, with the latter 
displaying significantly higher scores on the IUS.  
The grounding studies for the IU model of GAD have relied on self-report 
questionnaires. However, it is also important to assess the link between IU and worrying 
using experimental paradigms. So far, only a few studies have examined the premises of the 
proposed IU model of GAD experimentally. For example, a study of Ladouceur, Talbot, and 
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Dugas (1997) investigated the relation between individual differences in IU and subject’s 
performance during a task with varying levels of ambiguity. More specifically, participants 
were given various bags containing black and white marbles and asked to determine the 
ratio of black and white marbles in the bags, by drawing as much marbles from each bag as 
they needed to make that decision. The ambiguity level of the task was manipulated by 
changing the actual black/white ratio of the marbles and by mentioning different possible 
ratios to the participants. The dependent variable was the number of marbles that were 
drawn from the bags. Results showed that participants, who scored high on the IUS, drew a 
higher number of marbles before reaching a decision in the moderately ambiguous task. 
This effect was not observed during the high and non-ambiguous tasks. It was concluded 
that individuals who are highly intolerant of uncertainty, under certain conditions, “have a 
lower threshold for the perception of ambiguity than other individuals” (p. 361). In 
conclusion, the study of Ladouceur et al. (1997) examined the relationship between IU and 
GAD-related “doubting” behaviour. The behavioural reactions to the moderately ambiguous 
task at least provided some support for the validity of self-reported IU.  
A second study by Ladouceur et al. (2000) focused on the presumed effects of the 
experience of IU on worrying. During a computerized roulette game, participants were 
instructed to win a certain amount of money to enable a standard donation to a (fictitious) 
foundation. The level of IU was manipulated by providing participants with instructions that 
contained information on the probability of actually winning the required money. The 
instructions that intended to increase the level of IU stated that the chance of winning 
enough money was exceptionally low. The instructions to decrease the level of IU told 
participants that the chance of winning enough money was relatively high. Objective 
chances of winning were in fact determined by the computer and in actuality equal for all 
participants. Results indicated that participants in the increased IU group showed more 
worry as compared to participants who experienced a decreased level of IU. In other words, 
Ladouceur and colleagues (2000) experimentally manipulated participants’ level of IU, and 
thereby enhanced the level of worry, which is of course a result that seems to fit with the IU 
model of GAD. 
A third study by Grenier and Ladouceur (2004) also examined the relationship 
between experimentally induced IU and worry. In this study, the level of IU was manipulated 
by asking participants to imagine they had ingested a medicine and to repeat aloud 
statements reflecting increased (e.g., “It’s unfair to have no guarantees in life”) or decreased 
IU (e.g., “I am able to live with the uncertainties in life”). Results demonstrated that 
participants in the increased IU condition showed higher levels of worry than participants in 
the decreased IU condition.  
In sum, experimental studies on the link between IU and worry have shown that (1) 
individual differences in IU to some extent predict GAD-related “doubting” behaviour during 
an ambiguous task (Ladouceur et al., 1997), and (2) that experimentally manipulated IU 
enhances the level of worrisome thoughts or, if one likes, state worry (Ladouceur et al., 
2000; Grenier & Ladouceur, 2004). The current studies extend on this previous research 
and further explored the link between IU and worry using a somewhat different experimental 
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approach. More specifically, these studies investigated whether individual differences in IU 
(as indexed by the IUS) are able to predict levels of state worry in response to experimental 
situations that are either high or low in uncertainty.  
 
STUDY 1 
In the first experiment, it was investigated whether individual differences in IU (as indexed by 
the IUS) are able to predict state worry in response to an uncertain situation, that is, the 
completion of a partly unsolvable intelligence task. An attempt was made to induce high and 
low levels of uncertainty during the task, by providing subjects with differential instructions 
concerning the probable outcome of the task. It was anticipated that high levels of self-
reported IU would be accompanied by higher levels of task-related “state” worry, and that 
this would be particularly true under high levels of experimentally induced uncertainty. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 
participated in this study. Students were given course credits and a monetary fee for their 
participation. The sample included 31 women and 9 men, who had a mean age of 20.88 
years (SD = 2.11).  
 
Measures and procedure 
Firstly, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994) was 
administered. The IUS consists of 27 items assessing implications of being uncertain, 
attempts to control the future, and emotional, cognitive and behavioural reactions to 
ambiguous situations. Examples of items are “The ambiguities in life stress me”, “I always 
want to know what the future has in store for me”, and “One should always look ahead so as 
to avoid surprises”. Items are answered on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree). The IUS has excellent internal consistency (α = .94), satisfactory test-retest 
stability (r = .74), as well as good convergent and discriminant validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
Freeston et al., 1994). 
Next, participants were instructed to complete ten written word-association 
assignments derived from a Dutch intelligence test (Kooreman & Luteijn, 1987). These ten 
assignments had to be completed within five minutes. What the participants did not know 
was that half of the assignments were manipulated in such a way that they were unsolvable. 
The other five assignments were solvable and increased in difficulty. The Appendix shows 
an example of a solvable and an unsolvable assignment. 
Given that some assignments were unsolvable, all participants were hypothesised 
to feel uncertain. To increase motivation as well as disappointment, discomfort, uncertainty 
and possibly worrying, all participants were told that they would receive an extra, small, 
monetary fee for each assignment that was completed correctly. In addition, an attempt was 
made to vary the level of uncertainty by instructing some of the participants that the 
assignments were designed for measuring the IQ of young teenagers, and therefore they 
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would probably do very well on the task, while others received the instruction that the task 
was developed to measure the IQ of highly gifted people, and therefore it would be perfectly 
normal if they didn’t answer all items correctly. It was hypothesised that subjects who were 
given the former instruction would feel more uncertain and hence display higher levels of 
worry more those who received the latter instruction. The participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two instruction conditions. There were 20 participants in each 
condition. No age [t(38)= 1.28, ns] or sex differences [χ2(1,40) < 1.0] between the two 
conditions were found. 
After having spent five minutes in the lab, allegedly waiting for the experimenter to 
return with their task performance ratings, participants completed a self-constructed 7-item 
questionnaire. This questionnaire addressed worrisome thoughts regarding their 
performance on the test as experienced during the five minutes waiting period, i.e., task-
related state worry. The questions were: (1) “While waiting for the results on the task, I 
thought about the assignments for a long time”, (2) “I am concerned about my results on the 
verbal intelligence task”, (3) “I worried about (my performance on) the task”, (4) “I thought 
about (my performance on) the task”, (5) “After the task was over, I didn’t think of the 
results” (reversed item), (6) “While I was waiting for the results, I thought about the 
assignments regularly”, and (7) “Even though I felt I did well on the task, I kept thinking 
about it”. Questions were answered on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). A total score was computed by summing the ratings on all items (after recoding the 
reversed item), with a higher score meaning that the participant displayed higher levels of 
state worry (range: 7-35). Two extra open-ended questions inquired about the estimated 
number of correctly answered assignments and the number of thoughts about the task. The 
actual number of correctly answered assignments was also obtained. 
 
Results and discussion 
Before addressing the main research questions of Study 1, a number of general findings 
should be discussed. First, inspection of the mean scores on various measures indicated 
that the experiment induced low to moderate levels of state worry (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Mean scores (standard deviations) on various indices, and correlations between  
the IUS and state worry and other variables (Study 1) 
 M (SD) r with IUS  
IUS (27-135) 65.21 (11.38)  
State worry (7-35) 17.51 (4.11) .42* 
Number of thoughts about the task   2.98 (2.15) .36* 
Estimated number of items answered correctly   5.30 (1.22) -.09 
Actual number of items answered correctly   4.08 (.80) .19 
Note. N = 40. IUS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. * p < .01 
 
Second, it should be mentioned that participants answered on average four items correctly, 
but slightly overestimated their performance [paired t(39) = 5.83; p < .01]. Third, the internal 
consistency of the IUS was good (α = .85), and the reliability of the task-related state worry 
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scale was also satisfactory (α = .74). Fourth and finally, no gender differences were found 
for the IUS, the state worry scale, or any of the other variables.  
As hypothesised, scores on the IUS correlated positively with the state worry scale. 
Thus, higher levels of individual differences in IU were accompanied by higher levels of 
worry about the task. Scores on the IUS also correlated positively with the number of 
thoughts about the task, which indicates that participants who scored high on the IUS more 
frequently thought about the task during the five-minute waiting period. No meaningful 
correlations were found between the IUS and the estimated or actual number of correctly 
answered items. In contrast with our expectations, the differential instructions (i.e., high 
versus low uncertainty) did not produce differences on the worry variable, means being 
17.79 (SD = 3.92) and 17.35 (SD = 4.36), respectively [t(38) <1], or on the number of 
thoughts about the task, means 3.20 (SD = 2.65) and 2.75 (SD = 1.55), respectively [t(38) < 
1]. Neither did the two groups score differently on the actual and estimated number of 
correctly answered items [t(38) < 1 and t(38) = 1.30, p > .05, respectively]. Not surprisingly, 
then, the correlation between IUS and the worry scale was highly similar in the high and low 
uncertainty groups (r = .41, p < .05 and r = .42, p < .05, one-tailed, respectively). 
Although the link between IUS scores and state worry was as expected and 
appeared quite robust, the results were less informative on the issue of under what 
circumstances increased levels of IU result in enhanced worry. The additional instructions 
that were given to manipulate participants’ level of uncertainty were probably not powerful 
enough to yield differential effects on worry and thought frequency. In Study 2, an attempt 
was made to improve this aspect of the study. 
 
STUDY 2 
The second study was set up to induce high and low uncertainty levels by administering two 
versions of an IQ-test that actually varied in difficulty. Measures were added to check for 
anxiety levels of the participants before and after the experimental manipulation. Further, 
levels of uncertainty and worry about performance on the IQ-test were assessed as the main 
outcome variables.  
 
Method 
Measures and procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that they would 
have to complete an IQ-test. First, participants filled in the IUS (see Study 1). Then, 
participants completed a brief measure of state anxiety that consisted of 4 items from the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; e.g., “I feel 
anxious”), and two additional items measuring participants’ level of uncertainty (i.e., “ I am 
uncertain”) and test anxiety (i.e., “I am scared about taking the test”). These items were 
answered on a 100-mm visual analogue scale (VAS) with 0 = not at all applicable, and 100 = 
highly applicable. Next, a short IQ-test was administered. The IQ-test consisted of 10 
assignments that were selected from the “Test voor Niet-Verbale Abstractie” (“Test of Non-
Verbal Abstraction”), which is a Dutch instrument for measuring non-verbal, non-numerical 
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intelligence (Drenth, 1965). Briefly, each assignment was composed of four geometric 
figures with a specific communality. Participants were then presented with six new geometric 
figures, and instructed to choose the two figures that had the same communality as the 
initial four figures. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
condition intending to produce high levels of uncertainty, participants had to solve 10 
assignments that were difficult. In the low uncertainty condition, participants were presented 
with 10 simple assignments. All participants were informed that they would receive feedback 
on their performance at the end of the experiment. After completing the IQ-test, all 
participants filled out two specific questions concerning their level of uncertainty and worry 
thoughts about performance on the IQ-test (respectively “I feel uncertain about my 
performance on the IQ-test” and “I am worried about my performance on the IQ-test”). Next, 
the brief measure of state anxiety, uncertainty, and test anxiety was completed for a second 
time. Finally, participants were debriefed.  
Study 2 hypothesized that higher scores on the IUS would be related to worry 
about the test performance, and also to feelings of uncertainty about performance on the IQ-
test, state anxiety, uncertainty, and test anxiety, and that this would be especially true for the 
high uncertainty condition. 
 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduate students of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands, participated in this study. Students were given course credits for their 
participation. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions (see 
measures and procedures). Next, the two groups were matched with regard to scores on the 
IUS (which showed satisfactory internal consistency: α = .83), to ensure that the two groups 
were equal in their level of intolerance of uncertainty. As a result of the matching procedure, 
50 participants were retained. The final sample consisted of 25 students per condition and 
included 44 women and 6 men, who had a mean age of 20.96 years (SD = 3.84). 
 
Results and discussion 
Mean scores (and standard deviations) of the IUS and the various experimental variables 
are presented in Table 2. As can be seen, IUS scores were somewhat higher than those 
obtained in Study 1 but still within the normal range of this measure. Further, mean pre-test 
scores indicated that subjects reported low to moderate levels of state anxiety, uncertainty, 
and test anxiety. In passing, it should be mentioned that the internal consistency of the pre- 
and post-test state anxiety questions was satisfactory (respectively α = .81 and .87). No age 
[t(48) < 1] or sex differences [χ2(1,50) = 3.03, ns] between the two conditions were found. In 
addition, prior to the IQ-test, participants in both conditions did not differ on levels of state 
anxiety, uncertainty, test anxiety, or IUS scores, all ts(48) < 1.45, ns.  
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Table 2. Means (standard deviations) for the IUS and various experimental variables, and correlations 
between the IUS and other variables, computed separately for the high and low uncertainty conditions 
(Study 2) 
Variables High uncertainty Low uncertainty 
 M (SD) r with IUS   M (SD) r with IUS 
IUS 67.00 (7.34)a  68.20 (6.75)a  
Pre-test state anxiety 110.12 (82.90)a .56** 101.24 (73.69)a .28 
Pre-test uncertainty 31.20 (25.74)a .46* 25.64 (22.41)a  .41* 
Pre-test test anxiety 27.32 (30.96)a .40* 16.84 (18.64)a  .46* 
Uncertainty about 
performance 
52.12 (28.84)a .10 29.64 (28.38)b .36 
Worry thoughts about 
performance 
32.56 (25.85)a -.11 18.00 (18.40)b  .41* 
Post-test state anxiety 114.36 (56.85)a .30 94.76 (65.20)a .27 
Post-test uncertainty 34.72 (21.23)a .26 22.24 (18.50)b  .48* 
Post-test test anxiety 23.72 (21.35)a .21 16.76 (19.87)a  .44* 
Note. N = 25 in each condition, IUS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, * p < .05, ** p < .01. Means within 
the same row with different subscripts indicate significant difference at p < .05. 
 
A t-test demonstrated that the experimental manipulation was successful, that is, 
participants in the high uncertainty condition displayed higher levels of uncertainty about 
their performance on the IQ test than the participants in the low uncertainty condition, means 
being 52.12 (SD = 28.84) versus 29.64 (SD = 28.38)[t(48) = 2.78, p < .01]. Participants in 
the high uncertainty condition also showed significantly higher levels of worry about their 
performance on the test, means being 32.56 (SD = 25.85) versus 18.00 (SD = 18.17)[t(48) = 
2.30, p < .05]. No differences were observed for post-test state and test anxiety scores [both 
ts(48)s < 1.20, ns. However, participants in the high uncertainty condition displayed higher 
levels of post-test uncertainty than participants in the low uncertainty condition, means being 
respectively 34.72 (SD = 21.23) versus 22.24 (SD = 18.50)[t(48)= 2.22, p < .05]. 
Correlations between the IUS and the experimental variables were computed for 
each of the conditions. As shown in Table 2, in both conditions, most correlations between 
the IUS and pre-test state anxiety, pre-test uncertainty, and pre-test test anxiety were 
positive and significant (all rs between .40 and .56, ps < .05), with the exception of the 
correlation between IUS and pre-test state anxiety in the low uncertainty condition (r = .28, p 
> .05), which was nevertheless in the expected direction.  
To investigate whether individual differences in IU would predict levels of worry, 
and in particular under high uncertain circumstances, correlations between IUS and worry 
about performance on the IQ test were examined. Surprisingly, only in the low uncertainty 
condition, the predicted correlation between IUS and worry was found (r = .41, p< .05), as 
well as positive associations between IUS and post-test uncertainty, and post-test test 
anxiety (rs between .44 and .48, all ps < .05). In the high uncertainty condition, these 
correlations were weaker. In particular, it is important to note that precisely in this condition 
the correlation between IUS and worry was totally absent (r = -.11).  
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To summarize, in Study 2, the experimental manipulation appeared successful, as 
both conditions differed in levels of uncertainty following the IQ-test. Further, the 
hypothesized relation between individual differences in IU (as indexed by the IUS) and worry 
about test performance was found, but surprisingly only in the low uncertainty condition. In 
the high uncertainty condition, the predicted link between IUS scores and worry about test 
performance did not emerge. Further, in the low uncertainty condition, IUS scores were also 
positively correlated to post-test uncertainty and test anxiety scores which further 
demonstrates that within this condition, subjects with higher levels of IU were more 
distressed than subjects with lower levels of IU.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
These experimental studies were conducted to further examine the empirical tenability of the 
IU model of GAD (Dugas et al., 1998). Previous experimental studies on the link between IU 
and worry showed (1) that individual differences in IU to some extent predict GAD-related 
“doubting” behaviour during an ambiguous task (Ladouceur et al., 1997), and (2) that 
experimentally manipulated IU enhances the level of worrisome thoughts or, if one likes, 
state worry (Ladouceur et al., 2000; Grenier & Ladouceur, 2004). The current studies made 
an attempt to investigate whether individual differences in IU are predictive of (state) worry 
in response to experimental situations that are either high or low in uncertainty. Although in 
Study 1 the link between IUS scores and state worry was demonstrated, it could not be 
explicated under what circumstances individual differences in IU result in higher levels of 
worry. The results of Study 2 were more conclusive in this respect, as they indicated that in 
particular under low uncertain circumstances, individual differences in IU were predictive of 
worry. Interestingly, in a high uncertainty situation, this relation between IU and worry was 
not found. Note that this finding is similar to that reported by Ladouceur et al. (1997), who 
demonstrated that individual differences in IU predicted GAD-related doubting behaviour, 
but only in response to a moderately ambiguous situation, and not in a non- or high 
ambiguous situation. Ladouceur et al. (1997) therefore concluded that “individuals who are 
intolerant of uncertainty have a lower threshold of perception of ambiguity than other 
individuals” (p. 361). All in all, the results seem to indicate that the relation between IU and 
worry is not linear. That is, IU levels only seem to hold predictive value for worry-related 
behaviour when persons are in a situation that makes them really doubtful or uncertain. 
Situations that are experienced as either clearly high or very low in uncertainty, seem to 
elicit normal, adaptive reactions, and under such conditions, IU is not predictive of worry. 
A few shortcomings of the present study need to be mentioned. One obvious 
methodological limitation of the two experiments is the generalisability of nonclinical 
participants. Experimental research with clinical subjects is certainly needed to further 
validate the IU model of GAD (Dugas et al., 1998). A second limitation pertains to the fact 
that the present samples predominantly consisted of women. However, there is no reason to 
assume that there are gender differences in the relation between IU and worry. For 
example, a recent study of Robichaud, Dugas, and Conway (2003) demonstrated that 
gender differences in worrying could not be explained by sex-related variations in 
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intolerance of uncertainty, which indicates that the relation between IU and worry is not 
dependent on gender.  
All in all, the studies reported in this article touched on important issues. On the 
one hand, the relation between IU and worry was confirmed. On the other hand, the relation 
between individual differences in IU and worry only seems to emerge under certain 
circumstances. That is, when a person is in a situation that elicits a certain amount of 
uncertainty and doubt, this personality characteristic will have predictive value for the level of 
worry.  
51 
Chapter 3 
REFERENCES 
Aikins, D. E., & Craske, M. G. (2001). Cognitive theories of generalized anxiety disorder. 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 24, 57-74. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th ed.): Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association: American 
Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. 
Borkovec, T. D., & Lyonfields, J. D. (1993). Worry: Thought suppression of emotional 
processing. In H. W. Krohne (Ed.), Attention and avoidance: Strategies in coping 
with aversiveness (pp. 101-118). Kirkland, WA: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. 
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stöber, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon intimately 
linked to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral processes. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 22, 561-576. 
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary exploration 
of worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
21, 9-16. 
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2002). The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale: Psychometric 
properties of the English version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 931-946. 
Drenth, P. J. D., 1965. Test voor Niet Verbale Abstractie handleiding. Lisse: Swets & 
Zeitlinger.  
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (1997). Intolerance of uncertainty and 
problem orientation in worry. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 21, 593-606. 
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalized anxiety 
disorder: A preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 36, 215-226. 
Freeston, M. H., Rheaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do 
people worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 791-802. 
Grenier, S., & Ladouceur, R. (2004). Manipulation de l'intolerance a l'incertitude et 
inquietudes. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 36, 56-65. 
Kooreman, A. & Luteijn, F. (1987). Groninger Intelligentie Test GIT: Schriftelijke verkorte 
vorm. Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.  
Ladouceur, R., Blais, F., Freeston, M. H., & Dugas, M. J. (1998). Problem solving and 
problem orientation in generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
12, 139-152. 
Ladouceur, R., Gosselin, P., & Dugas, M. J. (2000). Experimental manipulation of 
intolerance of uncertainty: A study of a theoretical model of worry. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 38, 933-941. 
Ladouceur, R., Talbot, F., & Dugas, M. J. (1997). Behavioral expressions of intolerance of 
uncertainty in worry. Behavior Modification, 21, 355-371. 
Robichaud, M., Dugas, M. J., & Conway, M. (2003). Gender differences in worry and 
associated cognitive-behavioral variables. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 501-
516. 
52 
Worrying in the lab 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Wells, A. (1994). A multi-dimensional measure of worry: Development and preliminary 
validation of the Anxious Thoughts Inventory. Anxiety, Stress and Coping: An 
International Journal, 6, 289-299. 
Wells, A., & Carter, K. (1999). Preliminary tests of a cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 585-594. 
53 
Chapter 3 
Appendix. Two examples of the written word-association assignments 
 Assignment Answers options 
Solvable Boy - Girl 
Father - Mother 
Man - ? 
Lad 
Big 
Strong 
Woman (correct answer) 
Wife 
Unsolvable Flower - Vase 
Bush - Garden 
Tree - ? 
Pollen 
Grass haulm 
Fence 
Flower bulb 
Rake 
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Chapter 4.1 
Abstract 
The relation between cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry, and their connections to 
symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts were examined. Fifty-three undergraduate 
students completed the expanded version of the Cognitive Self-consciousness Scale, the 
Meta-worry subscale of the Anxious Thought Inventory, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
and the Padua Inventory-Revised. Results showed that cognitive self-consciousness and 
meta-worry were moderately correlated (r = .57). Further, both constructs were positively 
associated with symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts. When controlling for cognitive 
self-consciousness, meta-worry remained significantly correlated to both types of symptoms. 
Yet, when controlling for meta-worry, correlations between cognitive self-consciousness and 
symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts clearly attuned and were no longer significant. 
These findings suggest that meta-worry is more important for understanding excessive, 
intrusive thought patterns than the mere tendency to monitor one’s thoughts. 
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Introduction 
Several research lines have focused on explaining excessive, intrusive thought patterns 
such as obsessions and worry. For example, Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, and Heffelfinger 
(2003) found evidence to suggest that cognitive self-consciousness, which refers to the 
tendency to monitor one’s thoughts (see also Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), plays a role 
in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Briefly, their study showed that 
cognitive self-consciousness differentiated patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder from 
other anxious patients. Wells (1995) described the seemingly related concept of meta-worry, 
which can be defined as negative appraisals of worry activity, and linked this concept to 
generalized anxiety disorder. Indeed, evidence was obtained showing that patients with 
generalized anxiety disorder display higher levels of this cognitive factor than patients with 
social phobia or panic disorder (Wells & Carter, 2001). Although cognitive self-
consciousness and meta-worry have been treated as separate constructs, it can be argued 
that there are similarities between both phenomena. For example, it seems plausible that 
meta-worry is initiated after a person has monitored his/her thoughts. Further, it is also likely 
that meta-worry leads to an increase of the awareness of thoughts. Thus, it may well be that 
cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry are closely allied constructs. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether cognitive self-consciousness is exclusively related to obsessional 
symptomatology, and whether meta-worry is uniquely linked to worrying. 
The present study was undertaken to assess the association between cognitive 
self-consciousness and meta-worry, and to examine the specificity of both constructs for 
explaining obsessional thoughts and worry symptoms. It was hypothesized that cognitive 
self-consciousness and meta-worry are at least to some extent related. Further, in keeping 
with the literature, it was predicted that cognitive self-consciousness would be more clearly 
linked to obsessions, whereas meta-worry would be more convincingly associated with 
worrying. 
 
Method 
A group of 53 undergraduates (10 males, 43 females; M = 20.0 years, SD = 1.56) completed 
the expanded version of Cognitive Self-consciousness Scale (Janeck et al., 2003) which 
measures the tendency to monitor one’s thoughts, a subscale of the Anxious Thoughts 
Inventory to index meta-worry (Wells, 1994), and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the Padua Inventory-Revised (van Oppen, 
Hoekstra, & Emmelkamp, 1995), respectively measuring symptoms of worry and 
obsessional thoughts. The psychometric properties of these measures have proven to be 
highly satisfactory, and this was supported by good internal consistencies of various scales 
in the present study (i.e., all Cronbach’s alphas were between .81 and .93). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Mean scores were 34.19 (SD = 9.27) on the Cognitive Self-consciousness Scale, 10.54 (SD 
= 3.21) on the Meta-worry subscale of the Anxious Thought Inventory, 47.43 (SD = 9.79) on 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, and 33.75 (SD = 19.22) on the Padua Inventory-
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Revised. Table 1 displays correlations between the scales for measuring cognitive self-
consciousness and meta-worry, on the one hand, and symptoms of worry and obsessional 
thoughts, on the other. As can be seen, all correlations were positive and significant, which 
essentially means that the constructs of cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry were 
both related to symptoms of worry as well as obsessional thoughts. Scores on the Cognitive 
Self-consciousness Scale and the Meta-worry subscale of the Anxious Thought Inventory 
were also significantly correlated (r = .57, p < .001, two-tailed).  
 
Table 1. Correlations between scales measuring cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry on the 
one hand, and scales assessing symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts, on the other (N = 53). 
 Penn State Worry Questionnaire Padua Inventory- 
Revised 
Cognitive Self-consciousness Scale .53** .33* 
Anxious Thought Inventory-Meta-worry .59**  .40** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
To assess the specificity of cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry for 
symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts, partial correlations were computed. Results 
showed that when controlling for levels of meta-worry, scores on the Cognitive Self-
consciousness Scale were no longer substantially correlated with scores on the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire and the Padua Inventory-Revised (partial r’s being .26 and .10, p’s > 
.05, two-tailed). However, scores on the Meta-worry subscale remained significantly 
correlated to Penn State Worry Questionnaire and Padua Inventory-Revised scores, even 
after the influence of cognitive self-consciousness was partialled out (partial r’s being .42 
and .30, respectively, p’s < .05, two-tailed).  
Altogether, these findings indicate that cognitive self-consciousness and meta-
worry are moderately correlated. Furthermore, examination of the specificity of cognitive 
self-consciousness and meta-worry for explaining psychopathological thought processes 
suggested that meta-worry appears to play a more prominent role. As such, the results 
suggest that meta-worry might be a harmful, that is, “toxic” element of being aware of one’s 
thoughts, and at least warrant the hypothesis that meta-worry might be more important for 
understanding excessive, intrusive thought patterns than cognitive self-consciousness. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the current study was correlational in nature and 
relied on a small, non-clinical sample that predominantly contained females. Thus, it remains 
to be seen to what extent these findings generalize to clinical samples and actually have 
repercussions for current models on the pathogenesis of excessive, intrusive thought 
processes.  
60 
Cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry 
References 
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997) Beliefs about worry and intrusions: the Meta-
Cognitions Questionnaire and its correlates. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 279-
296. 
Janeck, A. S., Calamari, J. E., Riemann, B. C., & Heffelfinger, S. K. (2003) Too much 
thinking about thinking? Metacognitive differences in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 181-195. 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990) Development and 
validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 28, 487-495. 
van Oppen, P., Hoekstra, R. J., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (1995) The structure of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 15-23. 
Wells, A. (1994) A multi-dimensional measure of worry: development and preliminary 
validation of the Anxious Thoughts Inventory. Anxiety, Stress and Coping: An 
International Journal, 6, 289-299. 
Wells, A. (1995) Meta-cognition and worry: cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301-320. 
Wells, A., & Carter, K. (2001) Further tests of a cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder: Metacognitions and worry in GAD, panic disorder, social phobia, 
depression, and nonpatients. Behavior Therapy, 32, 85-102. 
61 

 4.2 
ARE THERE SPECIFIC META-COGNITIONS 
ASSOCIATED WITH VULNERABILITY TO 
SYMPTOMS OF WORRY AND 
OBSESSIONAL THOUGHTS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
de Bruin, G. O., Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (in press). Are there specific meta-cognitions 
associated with vulnerability to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts? Personality 
and Individual Differences. 
Chapter 4.2 
Abstract 
This study focuses on a variety of meta-cognitions in a sample of non-clinical subjects. More 
specifically, the relations between cognitive self-consciousness (i.e., the awareness of one’s 
own thoughts), meta-worry (i.e., the negative appraisal of intrusive thoughts), and thought 
suppression (i.e., conscious attempts to avoid unwanted thoughts) were examined. In 
addition, associations between these three meta-cognitive constructs and symptoms of 
worry and obsessional thoughts were investigated. Results showed that meta-cognitive 
variables were positively related. Nevertheless, evidence was found to indicate that the 
strongly resembling concepts of cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry should be 
viewed as distinct factors. Further, meta-worry correlated (significantly) stronger with 
symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts than did the other two cognitive constructs. 
Finally, meta-worry and thought suppression were unique predictors of symptoms of worry, 
whereas cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry were unique predictors of 
obsessional thoughts. The implications of these findings are briefly discussed. 
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Introduction 
Recent research has focused on meta-cognition as a possible explanation for two forms of 
excessive intrusive thoughts, namely worry and obsessions. Meta-cognition can be defined 
as “stable knowledge or beliefs about one’s cognitive system and knowledge about factors 
that affect the functioning of the system; the regulation and awareness of the current state of 
cognition, and appraisal of the significance of thoughts and memories” (p. 302; Wells, 1995).  
Wells (1995) developed a cognitive model that is applicable to worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). He argues that not the content of worry but in particular 
meta-cognitive dimensions and the process of worry are involved in the development of 
problematic worrying. Wells (1994) constructed the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI) to 
distinguish two types of worry. Type 1 worry refers to the content of worry (e.g., worry about 
one’s health or social functioning), and is initiated because of positive beliefs about the 
function and effects of worry as a problem solving or coping strategy. Type 2 worry covers 
“worrying about worry, appraising negative thoughts as uncontrollable, and reflecting a 
desire to control thoughts” (p. 304; Wells, 1995). According to Wells’ (1995) model, worry 
becomes problematic when Type 1 worry becomes “overactive” and negative thoughts 
about ongoing worrying, that is, Type 2 worry (meta-worry), occur. A study of non-clinical 
participants has indeed demonstrated that problematic worrying is related to meta-worry, 
and that this link was independent of trait anxiety and content (type 1) worry (Wells & Carter, 
1999). Furthermore, research with clinically referred patients has demonstrated that meta-
worry differentiates patients with panic disorder, social phobia and depression from patients 
with GAD, with the latter showing significantly higher levels of meta-worry (Wells & Carter, 
2001). 
Following this line of research, Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) constructed a 
self-report measure tapping several meta-cognitive beliefs and processes that are implicated 
in obsessive thinking. This Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) consists of five 
dimensions, namely positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about the controllability of 
thoughts and corresponding danger, cognitive confidence, negative beliefs about thoughts in 
general including themes of superstition, punishment and responsibility, and cognitive self-
consciousness. Interestingly, only the Cognitive Self-Consciousness (CSC) scale, referring 
to the excessive tendency to be aware of, and monitor one’s thinking, differentiated patients 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) from other anxiety disorder patients with the 
former group showing significantly higher levels of cognitive self-consciousness (Cartwright-
Hatton & Wells, 1997). Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, and Heffelfinger (2003) replicated this 
finding, using an expanded CSC scale. Again, cognitive self-consciousness was elevated in 
OCD patients as compared to other anxiety disorder patients. These researchers concluded 
that “the excessive tendency to reflect upon one’s cognitive processes may increase 
opportunities for negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts, foster over-importance of thought 
beliefs, and increases the likelihood of developing OCD” (p. 180). Likewise, Cohen and 
Calamari (2004) have postulated that cognitive self-consciousness appears to be 
distinguishable from the (negative) appraisal of intrusive thoughts, and can be linked to the 
process of turning normal intrusions into abnormal obsessions. 
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A third important concept that is closely associated with meta-cognition is thought 
suppression, which can be defined as conscious attempts to avoid (unwanted) thoughts 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). The definition of meta-cognition implies that 
meta-cognition refers to awareness and regulation of current cognition states (Wells, 1995), 
and as such it can be argued that thought suppression also is a variant of meta-cognition. 
Furthermore, the concept of meta-cognition has been repeatedly associated with the loss of 
cognitive control (see Wells, 1995). Meta-worry in particular “could reflect a reciprocally 
incremental relationship between unwanted cognition and cognitive-behavioural attempts to 
suppress such cognition” (p. 297; Wells, 1994). Moreover, it is conceivable that heightened 
levels of cognitive self-consciousness and negative appraisal of one’s own thoughts (i.e., 
meta-worry) are associated with frequent efforts of thought suppression. Purdon (2004) 
already stated that suppression is driven by negative thought appraisal. Additionally, the 
counterproductive effect of thought suppression has been perceived as a possible factor in 
the etiology and maintenance of both GAD and OCD (Purdon, 1999; Wegner, 1989).  
In conclusion, current theoretical accounts suggest that meta-cognitive variables 
such as meta-worry and cognitive self-consciousness are involved in OCD and GAD. In a 
previous study by De Bruin, Rassin, and Muris (2005), the relation between meta-worry and 
cognitive self-consciousness as well as their link to symptoms of worry and obsessional 
thoughts was examined in a small sample of 54 non-clinical subjects. A correlation of .57 
was found between meta-worry and cognitive self-consciousness providing tentative 
evidence that these meta-cognitive variables are closely allied constructs. Furthermore, the 
results indicated that cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry were both positively 
related to pathological worry and obsessional thoughts. However, when controlling for meta-
worry, cognitive self-consciousness was no longer significantly associated with symptoms of 
worry or obsessional thoughts. In contrast, meta-worry remained substantially linked to 
worry symptoms and obsessional thoughts after the influence of cognitive self-
consciousness was partialled out. These results seem to indicate that meta-worry is more 
important for the understanding of excessive intrusive thought patterns than cognitive self-
consciousness.  
The present study was an extension of the previous study by de Bruin et al. (2005) 
and examined three meta-cognitive factors that are thought to be relevant for the 
development of worry and obsessional thoughts, namely cognitive self-consciousness, 
meta-worry, and thought suppression. The relationships among these three meta-cognitive 
constructs and their specific links to symptoms of obsessive thoughts and worry were 
examined in a large sample of non-clinical subjects. More precisely, the following issues 
were addressed. To begin with, correlations among meta-worry, cognitive self-
consciousness, and thought suppression were computed. In addition, to gain more insight in 
the degree of overlap between cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry, a joint factor 
analysis was conducted on a data set including both constructs. Further, in replication of De 
Bruin et al. (2005), it was examined whether the three meta-cognitive constructs show 
differential relationships to intrusive thought patterns. Finally, it was explored to what extent 
cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry and thought suppression each make a unique 
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contribution to symptoms of intrusive thoughts. It was hypothesized that the meta-cognitive 
constructs would all be positively correlated. Furthermore, in spite of the expected positive 
link between meta-worry and cognitive self-consciousness, it was predicted that the joint 
factor analysis would identify them as two separate constructs. Lastly, it was hypothesized 
that all meta-cognitive constructs would be positively linked to symptoms of worry and 
obsessional thoughts. However, based on earlier work (de Bruin et al. 2005), it was 
expected that meta-worry would be most substantially linked to symptoms of both worry and 
obsessional thoughts, and would make the largest unique contribution to both patterns of 
intrusive thought. 
 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
All participants were recruited via the Internet. On several Dutch sites, 
advertisements were placed inviting people to participate in a brief online study. Participants 
either had the opportunity to fill out a small set of measures that only contained the CSC 
scale and the meta-worry questionnaire, or an extended set which also included scales for 
measuring thought suppression and symptoms of excessive intrusive thoughts. Two-
hundred-and-eleven participants (52 men and 159 women; mean age = 37.33 years, SD = 
12.05, range 15-72) completed the small set of measures; these data were used for the 
factor analysis. One-hundred-and-thirty-six participants (30 men, 106 women; mean age = 
36.35 years, SD = 12.09, range 17-71) filled out the extended set and these data could be 
employed for studying the relations among the three cognitive constructs (i.e., meta-worry, 
cognitive self-consciousness, and thought suppression), and their links to symptoms of 
excessive intrusive thoughts. No exact information on the background of the participants 
was available, although it should be mentioned that none of them indicated that they (had) 
received psychological treatment for mental disorders. 
 
Measures 
The Cognitive Self-Consciousness Scale (CSC; Janeck et al., 2003) measures the 
tendency to be aware of and monitor one’s thinking. The CSC that was employed in the 
present study consisted of 11 items (e.g., “I monitor my thoughts”) that had to be answered 
on a 4-point scale (1 = disagree, 4 = strongly agree). Originally, the CSC was a 7-item 
subscale of the Meta Cognitions Questionnaire (see Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). 
Janeck et al. (2003) expanded the subscale by adding 7 items derived from the Pain 
Vigilance and Awareness Questionnaire (McCracken, 1997). They found high internal 
consistency (α = .94) and good incremental validity for their expanded version. However, the 
results of a recent psychometric analysis by Cohen and Calamari (2004) have indicated that 
it is preferable to exclude the three reversed items as these clearly have a negative impact 
on the reliability of the scale. We followed this suggestion and thus employed a shortened 
version of the CSC (CSC-S). 
The Anxious Thought Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994) measures three types of worry: 
two content-related worry dimensions (i.e., worry about social affairs and worry about 
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physical health) and one process worry dimension (i.e., meta-worry). Only this latter 
subscale was included in the present study. As mentioned earlier, meta-worry can be 
defined as the negative appraisal of worrying itself. The meta-worry subscale of the AnTI 
consists of 7 items (e.g., “I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like”), 
which are answered on a 4-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). Previous 
research has shown that the meta-worry subscale is reliable in terms of internal consistency 
(α = .75) and test-retest stability (the correlation over a 6-week period was .77; Wells, 1994). 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) consists 
of 15 items that have to be answered on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). The Dutch translation of the WBSI was demonstrated to possess good reliability and 
validity (Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996). However, it has been noted that the 
WBSI does not only measure thought suppression, but also addresses the experience of 
intrusive thoughts (see Rassin, 2003). Several authors suggested a two-factor structure for 
the WBSI, with one factor representing “real” thought suppression and the other referring to 
the experience of intrusive thoughts (see Höping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003; Rassin, 2003). As 
the factor solutions found in these two studies were not completely identical, we decided to 
construe a “pure” thought suppression index that only contained items that consistently 
loaded on the suppression factor in both studies (i.e., original WBSI-items 1, 10, 11, 13 and 
14). 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) measures trait-like worry. The PSWQ consists of 16 items obtaining information about 
the frequency and intensity of worrying (e.g., “My worries overwhelm me”). Items are 
answered on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all typical for me; 5 = very typical of me). Item 
ratings are summed to yield a total worry score, with a higher score indicating a higher level 
of worry. The PSWQ has good internal consistency (with α’s between .86 and .94; see 
Davey, 1993), test-retest reliability (the correlation over a 8-10 week period was .92), and 
satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity (Meyer et al., 1990).  
The Padua Inventory-Revised (PI-R; van Oppen, Hoekstra, & Emmelkamp, 1995) 
is an abbreviated version of the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) and consists of 41 items 
(e.g., “I tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary”, “Before I go to sleep I 
have to do certain things in a certain order”, and “I feel my hands are dirty when I touch 
money”) that are all indicative of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Items are rated on a 5-
point scale (0 = not at all, 4 = very much). A total PI-R score can be obtained, with a higher 
score indicating higher levels of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The reliability and validity 
of the PI-R is satisfactory (van Oppen et al., 1995). 
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Results 
General findings 
Mean scores (standard deviations) and Cronbach α values for the questionnaires 
that were used in this study are shown in Table 1. It should be mentioned that scores on the 
PI-R, PSWQ, CSC-S, AnTI Meta-worry, and WBSI suppression were well in line with those 
obtained in previous studies of non-clinical subjects (see respectively van Oppen et al., 
1995; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003; Cohen & Calamari, 2004; Wells, 1994; McKay & 
Greisberg, 2002). Further, inspection of the data revealed that the kurtosis and skewness of 
all scales was within acceptable limits. The reliability of the various scales was satisfactory, 
with internal consistency coefficients ranging between .86 and .95.  
Furthermore, a gender difference emerged on the PSWQ, with women reporting 
significantly higher levels of worry than men (M = 52.14, SD = 11.80 versus M = 44.07, SD = 
14.34, respectively; t(134) = 9.92, p < .01), a finding which is in keeping with earlier research 
(see Robichaud et al., 2003). No effects of age were found. Thus, age and gender effects 
were rather small, and as it can be assumed that the relations between the three meta-
cognitive constructs and intrusive thought patterns are highly similar for both genders and 
across various ages, these demographic variables were controlled for in further analyses 
rather than focusing on them.  
 
Table 1. Mean scores (and standard deviations) and Cronbach’s α’s for the various questionnaires. 
 M (SD) α 
PI-R 30.04 (18.08) .93 
PSWQ 50.36 (12.80) .95 
CSC-S 25.70 (7.35) .92 
AnTI Meta-worry 11.84 (4.17) .86 
WBSI Suppression 16.92 (4.08) .87 
Note. N = 136. PI-R: Padua Inventory-Revised, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire,  
CSC-S: Cognitive Self-Consciousness-Shortened version, AnTI: Anxious Thought Inventory,  
WBSI: White Bear Suppression Inventory. 
 
Correlations among the three meta-cognitive constructs 
As expected, the correlation between CSC-S and AnTI Meta-worry scores was 
substantial and significant: r = .57 (p < .001). The correlations between WBSI-suppression 
and AnTI Meta-worry (r = .60, p < .001) and between WBSI-suppression and CSC-S scores 
(r = .52, p < .001) were of a similar magnitude.  
 
Factor analysis of cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry items 
A principal components factor analysis with an Oblimin rotation (as correlated 
factors were hypothesized) was carried out on the 11 items of the CSC-S and the 7 items of 
the AnTI Meta-worry scale. Four factors were found with eigenvalues > 1.00 (i.e., 7.32, 2.16, 
1.06, 1.01). However, the scree test indicated that inspection of the two-factor solution was 
justified. This solution accounted for 52.68% of the variance. The factor loadings are 
presented in Table 2. In general, AnTI Meta-worry items loaded most convincingly on the 
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first factor, whereas most CSC-S items loaded more clearly on the second factor. An 
exception to this rule was CSC-S item 11 (“I become preoccupied with my thoughts”), which 
loaded more convincingly on the “meta-worry” than on the “cognitive self-consciousness” 
factor. Note also that a number of other CSC-items (i.e., items 1, 7, 8, 9, 10) had substantial 
secondary loadings. 
 
Table 2. Factor loadings, obtained with an exploratory factor analysis (Oblimin rotation) of the CSC-S 
and AnTI Meta-worry items. 
  Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
AnTI 22 I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like. .86 .37 
AnTI 21 I think that I am missing out on things in life because I worry too 
much. 
.85 .38 
AnTI 20 I have difficulty clearing my mind of repetitive thoughts. .78 .35 
AnTI 19 Unpleasant thoughts enter my mind against my will. .70 .26 
AnTI 17 I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my 
mind. 
.69 .24 
CSC-S 11 I become preoccupied with my thoughts. .67 .64 
AnTI 16 When looking to my future I give more thought to the negative 
things than the positive things that might happen to me. 
.62 .31 
AnTI 18 I have repetitive thoughts such as counting or repeating phrases.  .54 .15 
CSC-S 6 I constantly examine my thoughts. .39 .82 
CSC-S 5 I pay close attention to the way my mind works. .25 .80 
CSC-S 7 I am very sensitive to the way my mind works. .61 .71 
CSC-S 3 I monitor my thoughts. .18 .69 
CSC-S 8 I focus on my thoughts. .43 .68 
CSC-S 4 I am constantly aware of my thinking. .23 .66 
CSC-S 9 I notice my thoughts even if I am busy with another activity. .56 .66 
CSC-S 1 I think a lot about my thoughts. .53 .63 
CSC-S 2 I am aware of the way my mind works, when I am working on a 
problem. 
.14 .63 
CSC-S 10 I seem to be more conscious of thinking than others. .47 .54 
Note. N = 211. CSC-S: Cognitive Self-Consciousness-Shortened version, AnTI: Anxious Thought 
Inventory. 
 
Correlations between meta-cognitive constructs and symptoms of intrusive thoughts 
To examine the links between the three meta-cognitive constructs and symptoms 
of worry and obsessional thoughts, correlations were computed (see Table 3). As can be 
seen, measures of cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry and thought suppression were 
all positively and significantly correlated to measures of worry and obsessional thoughts.  
Tests for comparing correlation coefficients (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) 
showed that the correlation between WBSI-suppression and worry was significantly greater 
than the correlation between WBSI-suppression and obsessional thoughts (Z = 2.27, p < 
.05). For cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry, such a differential pattern did not 
emerge: these cognitive constructs were equally related to both types of intrusive thoughts. 
70 
Meta-cognitions 
Because PI-R and PSWQ were significantly correlated (r = .43; p < .001), partial correlations 
were also computed (see right columns of Table 3). These partial correlations yielded highly 
similar results. That is, all meta-cognitive factors were significantly correlated with worry 
symptoms and obsessional thoughts. Further, after controlling for the overlap between PI-R 
and PSWQ, again the correlation between WBSI-suppression and worry was significantly 
greater than the correlation between WBSI-suppression and obsessional thoughts (Z = 2.58, 
p < .01).  
Next, it was examined whether obsessional thoughts and symptoms of worry 
showed differential relationships to the three meta-cognitive constructs. Results 
demonstrated that the link between obsessional thoughts and meta-worry was significantly 
stronger than the relation between obsessional thoughts and thought suppression (Z = 4.96, 
p < .01). Furthermore, worry symptoms and meta-worry were significantly stronger 
associated with each other than worry symptoms and cognitive self-consciousness (Z = 
3.43, p < .01). Other correlations did not differ significantly.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between CSC-S, AnTI Meta-worry, and WBSI-suppression on the one hand, and 
obsessive thoughts and symptoms of worry on the other hand. 
 PI-R PSWQ PI-R while holding 
PSWQ constant 
PSWQ while holding  
PI-R constant 
CSC-S   .48a,b .50a,d .33 .37 
AnTI Meta-worry .60b  .70b,c .46 .61 
WBSI Suppression .43a .60c,d .23 .51 
Note. N = 136. Correlations within the same row or column that do not share similar subscripts differ 
significantly at p < .05. PI-R: Padua Inventory-Revised, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire, CSC-
S: Cognitive Self-Consciousness-Shortened version, AnTI: Anxious Thought Inventory, WBSI: White 
Bear Suppression Inventory. All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
 
Unique contributions of meta-cognitive constructs to worry and obsessional thoughts 
To examine to what extent cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought 
suppression make a unique contribution to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts, a 
series of regression analyses were carried out (see Table 4). As mentioned earlier, gender 
and age were entered on the first step of the analyses in order to control for these 
demographic variables. On the second step, either symptoms of worry or obsessional 
thoughts were entered to control for their mutual influence. On the third and final step, 
cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry and thought suppression were entered to examine 
their unique contribution to both types of intrusive thoughts (i.e., worry and obsessional 
thoughts). In the regression analysis predicting symptoms of worry, gender made a 
significant contribution on step 1 (R2 = .07, p < .05). On step 2, obsessional thoughts also 
made a significant contribution to worry (ΔR2 = .17, p < .001). Finally, of the meta-cognitive 
variables that were entered on step 3, meta-worry and thought suppression were found to 
make a significant contribution to symptoms of worry (ΔR2 = .35, p < .001). In the final 
regression equation, all variables together explained 58% of the variance. When predicting 
obsessional thoughts, gender and age (step 1) did not account for a significant proportion of 
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the variance. However, symptoms of worry (step 2; ΔR2 = .18, p < .001), cognitive self-
consciousness and meta-worry (step 3; ΔR2 = .20, p < .001) did explain significant 
proportions of the variance. In total, variables explained 39% of the variance in obsessional 
thoughts. 
 
Table 4. Regression analyses predicting obsessional thoughts and symptoms of worry. 
Dependent Step Predictors β t p 
PSWQ 1 
 
2 
3 
Gender 
Age 
PIR 
CSC-S 
AnTI Meta-worry 
WBSI Suppression 
    .26** 
 .01 
    .41** 
 .11 
    .50** 
    .23** 
3.12 
  .11 
5.35 
1.50 
5.92 
3.10 
.00 
.92 
.00 
.14 
.00 
.00 
PIR 1 
 
2 
3 
Gender 
Age 
PSWQ 
CSC-S 
AnTI Meta-worry 
WBSI Suppression 
 .10 
-.03 
    .44** 
  .20* 
   .48** 
.06 
1.11 
-.30 
5.35 
2.15 
4.42 
  .67 
.27 
.76 
.00 
.03 
.00 
.50 
Note. N = 136. PI-R: Padua Inventory-Revised, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire, CSC-S: 
Cognitive Self-Consciousness-Shortened version, AnTI: Anxious Thought Inventory, WBSI: White Bear 
Suppression Inventory. * p < .05, ** p < .005 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the relations between three meta-cognitive factors (i.e., 
cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought suppression) and symptoms of worry 
and obsessional thoughts in a sample of non-clinical individuals. The main results of the 
study can be catalogued as follows. Firstly, the meta-cognitive constructs were all positively 
related with each other, with r’s ranging between .52 and .60. To gain further insight in the 
degree of overlap between cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry, a joint factor 
analysis was performed on the items of the CSC-S and AnTI Meta-worry scales. Results 
showed that the items of both constructs generally loaded on separate factors, in spite of the 
fact that some items had substantial secondary loadings. This seems to warrant the 
conclusion that cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry are related but nevertheless 
distinct meta-cognitive constructs. Thirdly, cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and 
thought suppression were all significantly related to symptoms of worry and obsessional 
thoughts. Nevertheless, a differential pattern emerged in the correlations between the three 
meta-cognitive constructs and indices of intrusive thought patterns. That is, the correlation 
between thought suppression and worry was significantly greater than the correlation 
between thought suppression and obsessional thoughts. Further and most importantly, 
meta-worry correlated (significantly) stronger with symptoms of worry and obsessional 
thoughts than did the other two meta-cognitive constructs (see also de Bruin et al., 2005). 
Finally, the results of the regression analyses indicated that the three meta-cognitive 
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constructs each had their own influence on intrusive thought patterns. That is, meta-worry 
and thought suppression were unique predictors of symptoms of worry, whereas cognitive 
self-consciousness and meta-worry were unique predictors of obsessional thoughts. In sum, 
in this non-clinical sample, meta-worry appeared to be consistently linked to various types of 
intrusive thought patterns, whereas thought suppression and cognitive self-consciousness 
only seem relevant when explaining a specific type of intrusive thoughts (respectively worry 
and obsessional thought). 
Three comments are in order with respect to these findings. The first comment is 
concerned with the results of the regression analyses that cognitive self-consciousness was 
relevant in explaining obsessional thoughts. It is not clear to what extent this variable is 
capable of predicting a broad range of obsessional thoughts. A study of Wells and 
Papageorgiou (1998) showed that cognitive self-consciousness only predicted dressing and 
grooming compulsions but no other obsessional symptoms after controlling for the other 
subscales of the MCQ. Thus, the exact influence of cognitive self-consciousness on 
obsessional phenomena in non-clinical subjects remains largely unknown and should be 
investigated in further research. The second comment is concerned with the fact that meta-
worry was related to symptoms of both worry and obsessional thoughts. As Wells (2005) 
stated, the meta-worry subscale of the AnTI concentrates on the appraisal of thoughts as 
being uncontrollable. The current data seem to suggest that this sense of uncontrollability 
represents the more toxic element of meta-cognition, and as such seems most relevant for 
understanding various types of intrusive thought patterns. Lastly, unexpectedly, thought 
suppression did not contribute to obsessional thoughts. This is in contrast with previous 
correlational research, which has demonstrated that thought suppression was significantly 
related to OCD symptoms (Purdon, 2004). However, it should be mentioned that there is 
one important methodological difference between the present study and the research 
described by Purdon (2004). That is, whereas the current study employed a pure thought 
suppression index, previous research used the total WBSI score that, as mentioned earlier, 
also includes intrusive thoughts, and as such may have inflated the relationship to 
obsessional thoughts. 
It should be acknowledged that the present study suffers from various limitations. A 
first shortcoming is the correlational design of this study. Such an approach does not make it 
possible to draw conclusions about cause-effect relations. Thus, it may well be that meta-
cognitive constructs such as cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought 
suppression result in intrusive thought patterns, but it is also possible that these meta-
cognitive factors are just a by-product of worry and obsessional thoughts. The second 
limitation is concerned with the fact that the study relied on non-clinical subjects. It remains 
to be seen whether these findings can be generalized to clinical populations including 
patients with OCD and GAD. Nevertheless, understanding the relations between meta-
cognitions and worry and obsessional thoughts in a normal population can also be 
considered as highly valuable because various authors assume that pathological 
manifestations of intrusive thought patterns lie on one and the same continuum (Mennin, 
Heimberg, & Turk, 2004; Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). The third drawback pertains to 
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the use of only one instrument for assessing the main constructs that were studied. Further, 
only self-report instruments were employed. It is clear that a multi-trait, multi-method 
approach is preferable for this type of research. Nevertheless, the current data provided 
some interesting information on the links between cognitive constructs such as cognitive 
self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought suppression, and intrusive thought patterns. 
The results suggest that in particular meta-worry plays an important role. In this regard, it is 
of interest to note that Wells (2005) recently developed a new measure for assessing this 
cognitive construct, namely the Meta-Worry Questionnaire (MWQ). This questionnaire 
specifically focuses on the perceived dangers accompanying worry and would be a more 
valid index of meta-worry than the subscale of the AnTI, which was employed in the current 
research. Clearly, future studies examining the role of meta-worry on intrusive thought 
patterns should also include the MWQ. 
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Chapter 5 
Abstract 
The present study investigated the relation between intolerance of uncertainty (IU), meta-
worry, and neuroticism on the one hand, and worry on the other hand, in a sample of 105 
university students. Two different operationalizations of worry were used: trait worry and 
idiosyncratic worry. Results showed that IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism correlated 
significantly with trait worry. Further, IU and meta-worry were strongly related but made a 
unique and independent contribution to trait worry. Finally, IU and meta-worry could be 
considered as partial mediators of the relation between neuroticism and trait-like worry. 
Relations of IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism with idiosyncratic worry were weak or even 
absent, although neuroticism was associated with idiosyncratic worry when the stressful 
event was more imminent. In conclusion, not IU and meta-worry, but the general 
vulnerability factor of neuroticism appeared to possess the most declarative value in relation 
to both trait and idiosyncratic worry. 
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Introduction 
Worry can be defined as anxious apprehension, which refers to “a future oriented mood 
state in which one becomes ready or prepared to attempt to cope with upcoming negative 
events” (p. 158; Brown, O'Leary, & Barlow, 2001; see also Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, 
& DePree, 1983). As a result, worrying may help the individual to effectively deal with future 
problems. However, preoccupation and over-reliance on worry can result in the perpetuation 
of anxious feelings, instead of reducing them (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). 
Furthermore, excessive worrying is the cardinal symptom of generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD; see DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000), which is a commonly 
occurring and debilitating mental disorder (Wells, 2004).  
Since the influential work of Beck (1976; see also Beck & Clark, 1997) and Ellis 
(1962) on the role of cognitive processes in anxiety and worry, various researchers have 
investigated the etiology and development of excessive worry and GAD within the context of 
cognitive-behavioural theory. One promising and relatively recent research line was initiated 
by Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, and Freeston (1998) who introduced the cognitive construct 
of intolerance of uncertainty (IU). IU refers to “a cognitive bias that affects how a person 
perceives, interprets, and responds to uncertain situations on a cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioural level” (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004; p. 835). A person who is 
characterized by high levels of IU will more easily perceive a future event as negative and 
potentially threatening than a person who is low on IU. Consequently, high IU individuals are 
more likely to display maladaptive cognitive, emotional, and behavioural reactions. Dugas, 
Buhr, and Ladouceur (2004) assume that IU plays a role in the etiology of worry in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples. Previous research, which employed the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), has 
demonstrated that (1) there is a unique link between IU and worry, which is independent of 
concurrent levels of anxiety and depression (Freeston et al., 1994), (2) IU can distinguish 
between GAD patients and non-clinical worriers (Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 
1998), (3) IU discriminates non-clinical subjects displaying GAD symptoms from those who 
do not display such symptoms (Freeston et al., 1994), and (4) GAD patients display higher 
levels of IU than patients with other anxiety disorders (Ladouceur et al., 1999).  
Another line of research that makes a feasible attempt to explain worry and GAD in 
terms of cognitive-behavioural theory is the meta-cognitive model of Wells (1995). According 
to this account, faulty meta-cognitions and meta-cognitive beliefs contribute to emotional 
problems. Wells (2004) postulates that it is important to distinguish between “type 1” worry, 
which pertains to worry about external events and internal though non-cognitive events such 
as physical symptoms, and “type 2” worry, which refers to the conscious appraisal of worry-
related processes. More precisely, “Type 2” worry is concerned with dysfunctional beliefs 
about worry, meta-cognitive appraisal of worry (i.e., worrying about worry or “meta-worry”), 
and the desire to control these thoughts. In other words, “type 1” worry applies to the content 
of worrisome thoughts, whereas “type 2” worry is responsible for uncontrollable and 
problematic worry levels (as seen in GAD). Support for this theory has been obtained in 
several studies. In a group of non-clinical participants, Wells and Carter (1999) not only 
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found that problematic worrying was associated with meta-worry, but also demonstrated that 
this link was independent of trait anxiety and content (type 1) worry. In addition, Wells and 
Carter (2001) showed that meta-worry can differentiate patients with panic disorder, social 
phobia and depression from patients with GAD, with the latter showing significantly higher 
levels of meta-worry. 
Two important issues can be raised when considering these cognitive-behavioral 
accounts of pathological worry. To begin with, the two research lines discussed above can 
both be considered as promising models for explaining excessive and uncontrollable worry 
in terms of cognitive constructs. In spite of similarities, so far no study can be found that has 
examined the connection between IU and meta-worry, and their relative contribution to 
symptoms of worry and GAD. Further, it may well be the case that IU and meta-worry are 
both components of one and the same vulnerability factor, namely neuroticism. Neuroticism, 
also known as negative affectivity, can be described as a stable and general trait dimension, 
which predisposes to “a broad range of negative moods, cognitions and self-appraisal” 
(Robichaud & Dugas, 2005; p. 2; see also Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994). Craske has 
postulated that neuroticism refers to the disposition to perceive threat easily and to become 
quickly aroused (Craske, 1999). As such, it is not surprising that neuroticism is thought to be 
closely related to worry and GAD (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Hettema, Prescott, & 
Kendler, 2004; Keogh, French, & Reidy, 1998; Steptoe & Kearsley, 1990). Although some 
researchers argue that neuroticism is not an explanatory concept (Ormel, Rosmalen, & 
Farmer, 2004), Claridge and Davis (2001) conclude that neuroticism can be informative 
when used in combination with disorder-specific constructs. Furthermore, Taylor (1998) 
argues that models that attempt to explain the etiology of fear and anxiety, should take 
general factors (e.g., neuroticism) as well as specific factors (e.g., IU or meta-worry) into 
consideration. 
It may well be the case that IU and meta-worry are cognitive concomitants of 
neuroticism, and play a mediating role in the link between this general vulnerability factor 
and symptoms of worry and GAD. Some support for this notion has already been provided 
by Sexton and colleagues (Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003) who investigated the 
hierarchical vulnerability structure of fear and anxiety. These researchers found evidence for 
a model in which neuroticism was associated with more specific vulnerability factors such as 
IU, which in turn were related to psychopathological symptoms like worry. Results indicated 
a (partial) mediation model with neuroticism as the predictor variable, IU as mediator, and 
worry as the criterion variable. Replication of a similar model in a clinical sample yielded 
comparable results (Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005). In general, the results 
seemed to be in keeping with a theoretical model in which a common vulnerability factor 
(i.e., neuroticism) predisposes to a broad range of anxiety problems, while more specific 
vulnerabilities determine specific anxiety symptoms and hence shape the type of anxiety 
disorder from which the individual comes to suffer (Taylor, 1998). However, more research 
examining the role and (relative) contributions of general and specific vulnerability factors to 
symptoms of worry and GAD is clearly warranted. 
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With these issues in mind, the present study examined the relations between IU, 
meta-worry, and neuroticism on the one hand, and worry on the other hand in a sample of 
non-clinical individuals (i.e., university students). Further, the relative contributions of the 
cognitive variables IU and meta-worry to worry were investigated. Finally, following the work 
by Sexton et al. (2003) and Norton et al. (2005), a mediational model was hypothesized in 
which the link between neuroticism and worry was mediated by the cognitive variables of IU 
and meta-worry. Two different operationalizations of worry were used to enable a thorough 
examination of the construct of worry in relation to these variables. First, general trait-like 
worry symptoms were measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and second, a specific scale was developed to 
investigate whether neuroticism and the cognitive constructs of IU and meta-worry also hold 
declarative value for idiosyncratic, situation-specific worry (i.e., worry about an important, 
upcoming examination). The idiosyncratic worry scale was administered on two separate 
occasions; five weeks before the examination and approximately 2 days prior to this event, 
which provided an experimental investigation of the cognitive correlates of situation-specific 
worry when the stressful event was less and more imminent.  
 
Method 
Measures 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994) consists of 27 
items assessing implications of being uncertain, attempts to control the future, and 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioural reactions to ambiguous situations. Items (e.g., “I 
always want to know what the future has in store for me”) are answered on a five-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). The IUS has excellent internal consistency (α = 
.94), satisfactory test-retest reliability (r = .74), as well as good convergent and discriminant 
validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 1994).  
The Anxious Thought Inventory (AnTI) was developed by Wells (1994) and 
measures three types of worry; two content-related worry dimensions (i.e., worry about 
social affairs and worry about physical health) and one process worry dimension (i.e., meta-
worry or the negative appraisal of worry itself). As the present study examined meta-worry, 
only this latter subscale was included. The meta-worry subscale of the AnTI (AnTI-MW) 
consists of 7 items (e.g., “I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like”), 
which are answered on a 4-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). Previous 
research has demonstrated that the meta-worry subscale of the AnTI is reliable in terms of 
internal consistency (α = .75) and test-retest stability (the correlation over a 6-week period 
was .77; Wells, 1994).  
The general vulnerability factor of neuroticism was measured by means of a 
subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 
1985). Twelve items (e.g., “Does your mood often go up and down?”) are answered on a 
dichotomous (yes or no) scale. Yes-responses are summed to produce a total score, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of neuroticism. The EPQ-N scale has good internal 
consistency (α = .84 for men, α = .80 for women) (Eysenck et al., 1985). 
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The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) was used to 
measure trait-like worry. The PSWQ consists of 16 items for measuring the frequency and 
intensity of worrying (e.g., “My worries overwhelm me”). Items are answered on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all typical for me; 5 = very typical of me). Item ratings are summed to yield a 
total worry score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of worry. The PSWQ has good 
internal consistency (with α’s between .86 and .94; see Davey, 1993), test-retest reliability 
(the correlation over a 8-10 week period was .92), and satisfactory convergent and 
discriminant validity (Meyer et al., 1990). 
The Worry about the Test Questionnaire (WTQ) was developed for the purpose of 
the present study in order to measure idiosyncratic worry thoughts about an upcoming 
graded exam. The WTQ items were derived from the PSWQ, but were modified in such a 
way that they were applicable to this specific situation. Six items of the original PSWQ were 
eliminated because they were formulated too strongly to apply to the situation at hand (e.g., 
“My worries overwhelm me”), displayed considerable overlap with another item (e.g., “I am 
always worrying about something” and “I never worry about anything”), or were items that 
explicitly measured trait worry (“I worry all the time”). The 10 WTQ items were answered on 
a 5-point scale (1 = not at all typical for me; 5 = very typical of me; see Appendix), and a 
total score was obtained by summing the ratings on all items. Some evidence for the 
psychometric qualities of the WTQ has been obtained. To begin with, WTQ scores are 
convincingly related to ratings on the Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI; see Spielberger, 1980), a 
scale that measures anxiety proneness in test situations (r = .68, p < .01). Further, the 
Cronbach’s alphas of the WTQ were also satisfactory (.86 and .88 on occasion 1 and 2, 
respectively). All in all, the WTQ appeared to measure the students’ idiosyncratic worry 
thoughts about an examination. 
All instruments were administered in Dutch. If available, official, copyrighted 
translations were used (i.e., EPQ) with permission. For the other non-Dutch scales, the 
English instruments as fully described in the original articles, were translated following a 
back-translation approach. It is important to note that the Dutch versions of the IUS, AnTI, 
EPQ-N and PSWQ all have been reported to possess satisfactory psychometric properties 
(see respectively deBruin, Rassin, van der Heiden, & Muris, submitted; deBruin, Rassin, & 
Muris, 2005; deBruin, Muris, & Rassin, 2006; Sanderman, Arrindell, Ranchor, Eysenck, & 
Eysenck, 1995; Van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). 
 
Participants and Procedure 
One-hundred-and-five students of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 
participated in this study. Students participated voluntary and received course credits for 
participation. The students gave informed consent and the Ethical Committee of Psychology 
approved the study. The 6 self-report measures, including the WTQ (i.e., WTQ1), were filled 
in five weeks before a final examination of the year. This examination tested students’ study 
progress of the past year, and partly determined whether students could proceed to the next 
academic year. The majority of the students (76.2%) reported that they felt clear pressure to 
pass the exam. Of the 105 students, 98 students (17 men and 81 women; mean age = 20.55 
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years, SD = 2.11, range = 18-29) completed the WTQ for a second time (i.e., WTQ2), on 
average 1.43 days before the examination.  
 
Results 
General findings 
Before addressing the main research issues of the present study, a number of 
general findings are discussed. First, mean scores on the IUS, the meta-worry scale of the 
AnTI, the EPQ-N, and PSWQ were all well in keeping with previous data obtained in non-
clinical participants and hence underline the normative character of the present sample 
(e.g., Sexton et al., 2003; Wells, 1994; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; 
Dugas et al., 2004). Second, the reliability of all questionnaires was satisfactory, with 
internal consistency coefficients ranging between .80 and .92 (see Table 1). Third, gender 
differences were evaluated by means of independent sample t-tests. Results only revealed a 
significant difference for the EPQ-N: women displayed significantly higher levels of 
neuroticism than men [M = 5.01, SD = 3.10 versus M = 3.35, SD = 2.26, respectively; t(96) = 
2.09, p < .05]. Fourth and finally, a paired-samples t-test indicated that worry about the 
examination showed a small but significant increase from the first to the second 
measurement of the WTQ [t(97) = 2.06, p < .05]. Meanwhile, the correlation between WTQ1 
and WTQ2 was fairly high (r = .79, p < .001). Thus, in spite of a slight increase as the test 
came closer, worrying about the test remained relatively stable during the five weeks before 
the examination. 
 
Correlations between cognitive factors and worry 
Correlation coefficients between all questionnaires are displayed in Table 1. The 
correlations between IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism were all strong and significant (rs 
between .60 and .66, ps < .001). IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism also correlated 
substantially with the measure of trait worry (rs ranging from .63 to .76, ps < .001). 
Furthermore, the correlations between IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism, on the one hand 
and idiosyncratic worry (measured by WTQ1 and WTQ2) on the other, were also significant 
(rs between .21 and .35), with the exception of the correlation between meta-worry and 
WTQ2, which approached significance (r = .18, p = .08).  
 
The relative contribution of IU and meta-worry to symptoms of worry 
The correlation between IU and meta-worry was .60 (see Table 1). Therefore, 
partial correlations were calculated to reveal the relative influences of IU and meta-worry on 
the PSWQ, WTQ1, and WTQ2. Results showed that, while controlling for meta-worry, the 
correlation between IUS and trait worry (PSWQ) remained significant (r = .41, p < .01), 
whereas the link between IUS and idiosyncratic worry was no longer significant (rs being .13 
on occasion 1 and .19, p = .07 on occasion 2). The partial correlations between meta-worry 
and worry symptoms (while controlling for IUS) showed a highly similar pattern. That is, the 
correlation between meta-worry and trait worry remained significant (r = .40, p < .01), 
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whereas the association between meta-worry and idiosyncratic worry was small and non-
significant (rs being .10 on occasion 1 and .03 on occasion 2). 
 
Table 1. Mean scores (standard deviations) and Cronbach’s α’s for the questionnaires that were used in 
the study, and correlations among the various measures 
 M (SD) α (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) IUS 61.19 (15.94) .92      
(2) AnTI-MW 10.00 (3.15) .80  .60**     
(3) EPQ-N 4.72 (3.03) .81  .66** .62**    
(4) PSWQ 45.80 (11.38) .92  .63** .63** .76**   
(5) WTQ1 29.68 (7.69) .86  .22* .21* .30* .43**  
(6) WTQ2 30.73 (7.90) .88  .25* .18 .35** .47**    .79** 
Note. N = 98, IUS: Intolerance of Uncertainty, AnTI-MW: Anxious Thought Inventory- Meta-Worry, EPQ-
N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Neuroticism, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire, WTQ1: 
Worry about the Test Questionnaire, first measurement, WTQ2: Worry about the Test Questionnaire, 
second measurement. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Test of mediational models 
As indicated by Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable can be seen as a mediator if 
the following conditions are met: (a) variation in levels of the independent variables (i.e., 
neuroticism) significantly account for variation in the presumed mediators (i.e., IU and meta-
worry), (b) variation in the mediators significantly account for variation in the dependent 
variable (e.g., trait worry), and (c) the previous significant relation between the independent 
and the dependent variable shows a significant decrease when controlling for the influence 
of the mediators. To test these conditions, partial correlations were computed that were also 
corrected for gender.  
The results of the first hypothesized mediational model (neuroticism → IU and 
meta-worry → trait worry) are shown in Figure 1.  
 
.44* 
.41* 
.27* 
.30* 
 
Neuroticism
 
Trait worry 
 
IU 
 
Meta-worry
.49* (.62*)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The partial mediational effects of Intolerance of Uncertainty and meta-worry on the relation 
between neuroticism and trait-like worry (* p < .01). Coefficient in brackets is uncorrected coefficient. 
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The first condition was met as the independent variable neuroticism was 
significantly linked to the mediators IU and meta-worry, even after controlling for the mutual 
effects of the mediators (r’s being .41 and .44, p < .01). The second condition was also 
fulfilled, as IU and meta-worry both significantly contributed to the criterion variable trait 
worry, even when controlling for the influence of neuroticism (r’s .27 and .30 respectively). 
The third condition, which implies that the relation between neuroticism and trait worry 
should decrease when controlling for the influence of the two mediators, was also met; the 
correlation dropped from .62 to .49. Preacher and Hayes (2004) argue that next to fulfilling 
the criteria mentioned by Baron and Kenny (1986), simple mediation models should also be 
tested via the more direct and statistically sound Sobel test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). This 
Sobel test assesses whether the indirect effect of the independent variable (i.e., neuroticism) 
on the dependent variable (i.e., trait worry) via the mediator (i.e., IU and meta-worry) is 
greater than zero. This proved to be the case; Z values were 2.67 (p < .01) for the mediator 
IU and 2.85 (p < .01) for the mediator meta-worry (see Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001 for 
calculations).  
Mediation effects of IU and meta-worry on the relation between neuroticism and 
idiosyncratic worry on occasion 1 (WTQ1) and on occasion 2 (WTQ2) were also tested. For 
both the models, the second condition stated by Baron and Kenny (1986) was not fulfilled; 
IUS and meta-worry made no significant contributions to idiosyncratic worry when controlling 
for their mutual influence and the effect of neuroticism. Thus, IUS and meta-worry cannot be 
considered as mediators of the relation between neuroticism and idiosyncratic worry on 
occasion 1 and occasion 2. Subsequently, regression analyses were run in order to clarify 
the relative contribution of the variables IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism on the dependent 
variables WTQ1 and WTQ2. Table 2 summarizes the results. When predicting idiosyncratic 
worry on the occasion 1, none of the variables appeared to have a unique and significant 
influence. Note that neuroticism was the only variable that explained a significant, albeit 
minimal, proportion of the variation in idiosyncratic worry on occasion 2.  
 
Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting idiosyncratic worry 
(WTQ1 and WTQ2) (N = 98). 
Dependent 
variable 
Predictor 
variable 
B SE B β Δ R2
WTQ1a EPQ-N 
IUS 
AnTI-MW 
  .57 
  .02 
  .11 
.37 
.07 
.33 
  .23 
  .05 
  .04 
.02 
.00 
.00 
WTQ2b EPQ-N 
IUS 
AnTI-MW 
  .88 
  .03 
-.20 
.38 
.07 
.33 
   .34* 
 .08 
-.08 
  .06* 
.00 
.00 
Note. a: R2 = .10, b: R2 = .13. EPQ-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire subscale neuroticism, IUS: 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, AnTI-MW: Anxious Thought Inventory subscale meta-worry, WTQ1: 
Worry about Test Questionnaire, first measurement, WTQ2: Worry about Test Questionnaire, second 
measurement. * p < .05 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the relation between IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism on the 
one hand, and worry on the other hand in a sample of non-clinical university students. 
Various worry operationalizations were used: that is, not only levels of trait worry were 
measured, but also idiosyncratic worry about an upcoming examination. First, zero-order 
correlations between all variables were investigated. In keeping with previous research, the 
results showed that IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism all correlated substantially with trait 
worry as measured by the PSWQ. Interestingly, the relations between IU, meta-worry, 
neuroticism, and idiosyncratic worry, measured on two occasions (WTQ1 and WTQ2), were 
considerably smaller but still significant, except for the relation between meta-worry and 
WTQ2. Secondly, the relative contributions of the two cognitive factors (i.e., IU and meta-
worry) on the worry variables were evaluated via partial correlations. IU and meta-worry 
correlated highly, but each factor made a unique and independent contribution to trait worry 
as indexed by the PSWQ, but not to idiosyncratic worry. Finally, tests of mediation revealed 
that IU and meta-worry can indeed be considered as partial mediators of the relation 
between neuroticism and trait-like worry. This result is in accordance with the results of 
Sexton, Norton, and colleagues (Sexton et al., 2003; Norton et al., 2005). Mediational effects 
of IU and meta-worry on the relation between neuroticism and idiosyncratic worry were not 
found. However, regression analysis indicated that neuroticism was involved in idiosyncratic 
worry on occasion 2.  
Although the cognitive factors of IU and meta-worry overlapped considerably, both 
variables seemed to have a unique influence on trait worry, independent of levels of 
neuroticism. However, IU and meta-worry were barely related to idiosyncratic worry. This 
result was in contrast with the assumption that specific, situation-related worry would also be 
linked to these cognitive factors. One explanation for the absence of an influence of the IU 
and meta-worry on idiosyncratic worry might be that the test evoked highly similar worry 
levels for all participants and as a result of this lack of variation, differential relations to the 
cognitive variables did not emerge. In a similar vein, it can be argued that the examination 
provoked only mild levels of stress and thus moderate levels of worry. That is, the average 
score on most WTQ-items was 3 (on a scale 5-point scale). Furthermore, when the 
examination was more imminent (occasion 2), somewhat stronger links among the study 
variables were found. On that occasion, the general vulnerability factor of neuroticism did 
explain a small but significant proportion of the variance in idiosyncratic worry.  
In sum, the current data seem to indicate that not the specific cognitive factors of IU 
and meta-worry, but the general vulnerability factor of neuroticism appeared to possess 
most declarative value in relation to both trait and idiosyncratic worry. This is somewhat at 
odds with the current notion in the literature, suggesting that neuroticism is not an 
explanatory concept (Ormel et al., 2004). Similarly, Claridge and Davis (2001) conclude that 
neuroticism can be informative, but only when used in combination with other disorder-
specific constructs that explain additional variance and hence have extra explanatory power. 
Taking these ideas into consideration and noting that after including the worry-specific 
factors of IU and meta-worry, neuroticism still explained a considerable proportion of the 
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variance in worry scores, it is most likely that there are still other cognitive constructs that 
come into play, possibly originating from or in combination with neuroticism (e.g., 
interpretation bias, memory bias; Dugas, Hedayati, Karavidas, Buhr, Francis, & Phillips, 
2005).  
The present investigation suffered from some limitations. Firstly, the sample 
primarily consisted of women. The inclusion of more men could have provided the 
opportunity to explore gender differences in the links among IU, meta-worry, neuroticism 
and worry. Secondly, the study examined the relations between neuroticism, IU, meta-worry 
and various worry operationalizations in a normal sample. Of course, similar research 
should encompass clinical samples before generalizations of the present results to 
pathological manifestations of worry (e.g., GAD) can be made. And finally, in the current 
study students probably experienced only mild levels of idiosyncratic worry. As such, 
subsequent research should target more stressful events that elicit more severe and 
pervasive idiosyncratic worry. Only when such research has been conducted, a more 
definite conclusion can be drawn about whether the cognitive factors of IU and meta-worry 
not only play a role in trait worry, but also contribute to the understanding of specific, 
situation-related worry. 
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Appendix. The 10 WTQ items, and the original PSWQ item numbers (from which the WTQ items were 
derived) 
Item Original PSWQ 
item number 
WTQ Question 
1) 1 Luckily, I have enough time to finish the exam, otherwise, I would worry 
about it. 
2) 3 I do not ten d to worry about the grade of the exam. 
3) 4 The exam makes me worry. 
4) 5 I know I should not worry about he exam, but I just cannot help it. 
5) 8 I find it easy to dismiss thoughts about the exam. 
6) 9 As soon as I finish the exam, I start to worry about the result. 
7) 10 I have not worried about the exam. 
8) 11 When I finish the exam, I am not concerned about it any more. 
9) 14 Once I start worrying about the exam, I cannot stop. 
10) 16 I worry about the exam until it is finished. 
WTQ: Worry about Test Questionnaire, PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
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General discussion 
This thesis focused on explicating two cognitive constructs, intolerance of uncertainty and 
meta-worry, which are both considered to be relevant concepts in theories explaining the 
etiology and maintenance of worry and GAD. In this section, the results of previous chapters 
will be summarized, theoretical and methodological issues will be discussed, and an attempt 
will be made to relate the current findings to the existing literature. Finally, recommendations 
for future research will be made. 
 
Summary and discussion of the main results 
In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated that the Dutch version of the IUS displayed similar 
psychometric properties as the French and English versions of this scale. The internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent validity were all satisfactory and 
comparable to previous versions of the IUS (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Norton, 2005). 
Further, a factor analysis of the Dutch IUS indicated a one-factor solution, confirming the 
idea of Norton (2005) that IU reflects a unidimensional construct, and the proposition of Buhr 
and Dugas (2002) to employ the total score of the IUS in research. In conclusion, the Dutch 
version of the IUS appeared to be a psychometrically sound questionnaire for measuring 
individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty.  
However, in a recent study by Carleton, Norton, and Asmundson (in press), the 
authors argue that none of these structures was optimal, and therefore decided to revise the 
IUS, which resulted in a shortened scale with a clear two-factor structure. These two factors 
appear reliable and stable and nicely represent two important components of intolerance of 
uncertainty, namely anxiety (prospective anxiety) and avoidance (inhibitory anxiety). Clearly, 
more studies are warranted to further examine the underlying structure of the IUS. 
Furthermore, examination of the psychometric properties of the Dutch IUS in clinical 
populations is required. 
In Chapter 3, two experimental studies are described in which it was investigated 
whether individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty predict levels of worry in 
response to uncertain situations. Both experiments confirmed that there seems to be a 
clear-cut relationship between IU and worry. The findings that emerged from these 
experiments may be helpful to understand under what circumstances levels of IU lead to 
heightened levels of worry. More precisely, the second experiment demonstrated that 
individual differences in IU gave rise to a higher frequency of worrisome thoughts in the 
experimental condition that was low in uncertainty. Moreover, in this low uncertainty 
condition, IUS scores were also associated with higher levels of post-test uncertainty and 
test anxiety. Thus, individuals who display higher levels of IU were more distressed than 
individuals with lower levels of IU, and this was particularly true in the low uncertainty 
condition. These results are partly in agreement with those of Ladouceur, Talbot, and Dugas 
(1997), who demonstrated that individual differences in IU predicted GAD-related doubting 
behaviour, but merely in a moderately ambiguous situation and not in a non- or highly 
ambiguous situation. Altogether, the findings seem to justify the conclusion that intolerance 
of uncertainty is predictive of worry levels, but only when a person truly feels doubtful or 
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uncertain. These feelings of doubtfulness and uncertainty can be determined by several 
factors, such as the individuals’ interpretation of the event, the level of intolerance of 
uncertainty, and the adopted coping strategy (see Greco & Roger, 2001). Worry is not 
instigated in high IU individuals when uncertainty is high or absent; these situations elicit 
normal and adaptive behavior, irrespective of individual levels of IU. Further experimental 
research should address this notion on the relation between intolerance of uncertainty and 
worry, in ambiguous and uncertain events.  
In Chapter 4, the relation between cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry on 
the one hand, and symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts on the other hand was 
examined. In recent literature, the first concept has been typically linked to OCD, whereas 
the second concept has been predominantly related to GAD. Although meta-worry and 
cognitive self-consciousness are consistently treated as separate constructs, it seems clear 
that these concepts share various features. For instance, it seems plausible that only after 
extensively monitoring one’s thoughts, a person will interpret his/her own thoughts 
negatively. In other words, when a person is barely conscious of his thoughts, it is not very 
likely that he will engage in negative thought evaluation. Further, it seems self-evident that 
the negative appraisal of one’s thoughts leads to increased awareness of these thoughts. 
Thus, cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry seem to be constructs that are akin. So 
far, it has been unclear whether cognitive self-consciousness is exclusively related to 
obsessional symptomatology, and whether meta-worry is uniquely linked to worrying, 
especially in non-clinical populations. The results of Chapter 4 indicated that cognitive self-
consciousness and meta-worry indeed seem to be related. In addition, it was found that 
meta-worry was significantly related to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts, even 
when controlling for the influence of cognitive self-consciousness. When the correlations 
between cognitive self-consciousness and symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts 
were controlled for the influence of meta-worry, these relations clearly attenuated and were 
no longer significant. These findings suggest that the negative appraisal of thoughts (i.e., 
meta-worry) is more relevant when studying pathological thought processes than cognitive 
self-consciousness (at least in non-clinical individuals). 
A further study described in Chapter 4 examined the influence of thought 
suppression. Results showed that the meta-cognitive constructs were all positively related 
with each other. Cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought suppression were 
all significantly related to symptoms of worry and obsessional thoughts. Thought 
suppression was more convincingly related to worry symptoms than to obsessional 
thoughts, while meta-worry was more strongly associated with obsessional thoughts and 
worry symptoms than the other two cognitive constructs. Furthermore, the results of 
regression analyses indicated that cognitive self-consciousness and meta-worry were 
unique predictors of obsessional thoughts, whereas meta-worry and thought suppression 
were unique predictors of symptoms of worry. Meanwhile, meta-worry appears to play a 
consistent role in various types of intrusive thoughts, whereas cognitive self-consciousness 
and thought suppression only seem relevant when explaining a specific type of intrusive 
thoughts (respectively obsessional thought and worry). 
96 
General discussion 
Thus, in non-clinical populations, it seems to be the case that meta-worry is 
(equally) relevant for various types of intrusive, anxiety-related thoughts. This conclusion is 
not in keeping with research conducted in clinical samples which consistently demonstrated 
that GAD patients portray significantly higher levels of meta-worry than other anxiety 
disorder patients (Wells & Carter, 2001). Furthermore, the results of the presented study 
suggest that thought suppression is predominantly linked to worry symptoms, and less 
relevant for symptoms of obsessional thought, which is also in disaccord with previous 
literature (Purdon, 1999). Perhaps then, cognitive processes such as meta-worry, cognitive 
self-consciousness, and thought suppression operate differentially in clinical and non-clinical 
populations.  
Furthermore, when looking more closely at the correlations between cognitive 
variables, and worry and obsessional thoughts as obtained in the two studies in Chapter 4, 
one has to conclude that the correlations with worry were consistently stronger. This could 
be due to the fact that in the non-clinical participants of these studies worry symptoms were 
more common than symptoms of OCD, which are more egodystonic and therefore probably 
less frequent in comparison to worry thoughts. Further research on the specificity of 
cognitive self-consciousness, meta-worry, and thought suppression for predicting various 
types of intrusive thoughts in non-clinical subjects is obviously needed.  
Chapter 5 addressed the relative contribution to worry of intolerance of uncertainty 
and meta-worry. In this study, worry was operationalized in two ways. First, levels of trait 
worry were measured by means of the PSWQ. Second, levels of idiosyncratic worry about 
an upcoming event were measured on two separate occasions (when the stressful event 
was less and more imminent). In addition to the two central constructs, a general 
vulnerability factor for anxiety symptoms, neuroticism, was also included. Results 
demonstrated that IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism all correlated substantially with trait 
worry. Considerably smaller yet mostly significant correlations were found with idiosyncratic 
worry. Tests of mediation models revealed that IU and meta-worry can best be considered 
as partial mediators of the relation between neuroticism and trait-like worry. However, these 
mediational effects of IU and meta-worry on the relation between neuroticism were not found 
for idiosyncratic worry. Here, the regression analysis indicated that only neuroticism was 
involved in idiosyncratic worry on occasion 2, that is, when the examination was more 
imminent. In sum, the data seemed to indicate that not the specific cognitive factors of IU 
and meta-worry, but the general vulnerability factor of neuroticism appeared to possess 
most declarative value in relation to both trait and idiosyncratic worry. However, some 
authors have argued that neuroticism is too general and non-informative to possess 
explanatory value (Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004). Claridge and Davis (2001) also 
adhere to this view but underline that neuroticism may still be informative if it is used in 
combination with disorder-specific variables. It seems most likely that there are still other 
cognitive constructs (e.g., cognitive biases in attention and interpretation) involved in the 
radicalization of worry, possibly originating from or in combination with neuroticism.  
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Integrative model for intrusive thoughts 
The main results of this thesis can be summarized in a model that is displayed in Figure 1. 
This model consists of a personality variable (i.e., negative affectivity or neuroticism) and 
several cognitive variables, which all contribute to symptoms of intrusive thoughts, such as 
worry and obsessions. The continuous lines in the model indicate a relation; the bold lines 
reflect a stronger relation, whereas the dotted lines represent a relation that is not studied in 
this thesis, but is known from the literature, or is feasible and needs to be investigated. 
The results of Chapter 5 have shown that the general vulnerability factor of 
neuroticism makes a direct contribution to worry, as this personality variable explained a 
significant portion of variance of worry, independent of IU and meta-worry. Alongside these 
two cognitive variables, thought suppression and cognitive self-consciousness are also 
related to worry. However, of these four cognitive variables, meta-worry consistently 
portrayed the strongest relation to worry.  
In addition, the studies in Chapter 4 make it possible to make some statements 
about the relations between various cognitive variables and symptoms of OCD. Again, meta-
worry displayed the strongest relation to symptoms of OCD. As such it can be concluded 
that meta-worry appears to play a consistent role in various types of intrusive thoughts. Note 
further that the four cognitive variables that are included in the model seemed related to both 
worry (GAD) as well as obsessional thoughts (OCD). In other words, at least in non-clinical 
populations these cognitive variables are not unique for one type of intrusive thought.  
Finally, it should be acknowledged that this model is not exhaustive. It is likely that 
other cognitive variables such as positive and negative beliefs about the use of worry and 
the employment of dysfunctional coping strategies other then suppression also play a role in 
the development of intrusive thought patterns such as GAD and OCD.  
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Figure 1. A model of cognitive variables that contribute to worry thoughts in non-clinical populations. 
 
 
 
Limitations 
In this section, three decisions about the way in which the studies in the present thesis were 
conducted, are explicated and discussed. 
 
Choice of measures 
The choice for the main research measures, namely the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994) and the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994), 
and not other questionnaires, was a carefully considered and deliberate one. To explain this 
choice, a non-exhaustive number of questionnaires that measure the same, or similar, 
concepts will be discussed hereafter. 
Some 60 years ago, Frenkel-Brunswik (1948) introduced a concept known as 
intolerance of ambiguity (IA), which was described as the tendency of an individual to 
perceive present (not future) ambiguity as threat or discomfort. Although there is little 
agreement on the precise definition of ambiguity (Greco & Roger, 2001), it is clear that IA 
shows considerable overlap with IU. IA can best be conceptualized as a perceptual and 
cognitive concept that has been employed in industrial and organisational psychology, 
whereas IU has been predominantly used in clinical psychology. Various subtests of 
intelligence tests have been used to measure IA, but the psychometric properties of these IA 
indices were not satisfactory. It is clear that new and more elaborated measures for IA are 
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needed (see also Greco & Roger, 2001) and that the currently available indices are certainly 
not suitable for measuring the concept of IU. 
Davey, Hampton, Farrell, and Davidson (1992) have constructed the 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary, a self-report questionnaire that assesses the 
individuals’ interpretations of “diary sections”. These diary sections are worded ambiguously 
(e.g., “I got a piece of coursework back and was surprised at the mark it was received), 
unambiguously positive or negative (e.g., “I went to Amanda’s party last night, it was 
brilliant!” and “We invited some friends round to join us for a barbecue, but no one turned 
up”). The participants have to fill in whether they are concerned or unconcerned by the 
events described in the diary. This questionnaire does not cover the whole concept of IU, 
but rather taps a person’s interpretation of ambiguousness. 
More direct measures of intolerance of uncertainty can be found in studies 
conducted on OCD-related phenomena, such as doubting behavior, estimation of threat, 
and uncertainty (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). In this type of research, intolerance of 
uncertainty refers to “beliefs about the necessity of being certain, beliefs that one has a poor 
capacity to cope with unpredictable change, and (..) the difficulty of adequate functioning in 
inherently ambiguous situations” (OCCWG, 1997; p. 678). Importantly, in the context of 
OCD, intolerance of uncertainty is viewed as one of the contributing factors, not as a primary 
factor. A number of scales have been developed that include the IU-like aspect of OCD. For 
instance, Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, and Thibodeau (1993) developed the Inventory of 
Beliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO), which not only yields information about (irrational) 
beliefs about the meaning of intrusive thoughts and their consequences, but also intolerance 
of uncertainty. In addition, the OCCWG (2001) developed the Obsessive Beliefs 
Questionnaire (OBQ-87), in which tolerance of uncertainty is also included as a subscale. 
Obviously, researchers from various theoretical backgrounds have been interested 
in the phenomenon of IU. As IU as defined in the model of Dugas and colleagues (Dugas, 
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998) was the main focus, the employment of the IUS 
seemed to be the most optimal choice. Recently, Carleton et al. (in press) reported on a 
short version of the IUS that consisted of only 12 items (instead of 27 items in the original 
version). The shortened scale appeared to be psychometrically sound and highly correlated 
with the original IUS. Further research employing this new and more economic measure of 
IU is recommendable. 
For measuring the concept of meta-worry, the AnTI was used, which at the time 
that this Ph.D. thesis started was the only scale for assessing this cognitive constructs. More 
recently, the Meta-Worry Questionnaire (MWQ; Wells, 2005), has been developed to 
specifically assess the frequency of meta-worry and the participants’ beliefs about the 
tenability of this meta-worrying thought. The MWQ thus focuses more on the perceived 
dangers that accompany this type of worry. An advantage of the new scale is that it clearly 
refers to the DSM-IV criteria for GAD (see American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
However, up till now no study has been conducted with this questionnaire, and so, little is 
known about the psychometric properties of the scale. As such, the employment of the 
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meta-worry subscale of the AnTI still seems justified, in particular as the studies employed 
non-clinical participants as opposed to GAD patients.  
In sum, excellent psychometric properties have been reported (see Buhr & Dugas, 
2002; Dugas et al., 1997; Norton, 2005; Wells & Carter, 1999) for both the IUS (Freeston et 
al., 1994) and the AnTI (Wells, 1994), and together with the fact that there were no better 
questionnaires available when the studies in this theses were conducted, the choice for 
these two specific questionnaires seems justified.  
 
Use of self-report measures 
The majority of the data presented in this thesis were obtained by means of self-
report questionnaires. Although the use of self-report measures is applied in numerous 
studies on psychopathology, one might argue that reliance on this type of assessment only 
provides partial information and may be susceptible to various biases (e.g., response bias, 
see for instance de Jonge & Slaets, 2005). However, as McNally pointed out “many aspects 
of psychopathology do not have overt behavioral manifestations other than self-reports of 
phenomenal states” (2001; p. 519), and this seems especially true for the cognitive 
constructs that were the subject of this thesis. In other words, concepts such as IU and 
meta-worry are best measured by self-report scales. Self-report measures and behavioral 
measures are a particular strong way to conduct research of cognitive constructs (McNally, 
2001). As such, the employment of self-report scales as well as experimental manipulations 
in several studies in this thesis simply seemed the best way to go.  
 
Use of non-clinical samples 
Another potential shortcoming of the present thesis is the fact that the main studies 
were conducted with non-clinical participants. Although some might even consider this as a 
major weakness of this thesis, several arguments can be made to tackle this conception. 
Firstly, according to Sexton, Norton, Walker, and Norton (2003), there is ample research 
evidence to support the notion that anxiety can best be viewed as a continuum with mild, 
normal manifestations of this negative emotion on one end and more severe, pathological 
anxiety as seen in phobias and anxious disorders on the other end (see also Chapter 1). In 
keeping with this idea, the use of normal participants as “analogue of individuals with anxiety 
disorders” (p. 92) is widely accepted. Furthermore, the general population includes healthy 
individuals as well as some individuals with more extreme levels of worry, so the general 
range of severity in anxiety manifestations is captured. Thirdly, Ruscio, Borkovec, and 
Ruscio (2001) already argue that “theories attempting to explain how and why worry 
becomes problematic must move beyond factors associated with the presence or absence 
of pathological worry. Instead, (one should) consider causal and maintenance factors 
associated with varying levels of worry severity within the full range of worry presentations” 
(p. 418). As such, research that employs normal participants certainly contributes to the 
understanding of worry, and may elucidate processes and mechanisms that are present 
before pathological levels occur. Moreover, the experimental psychopathology approach as 
advocated by Jansen, Merckelbach, and Van de Hout (1992) and many others encourage 
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experimental research with normal controls. More specifically, advocates of this approach 
plead for an extended practice of experimental research, in which psychopathological 
phenomena are investigated and replicated in the laboratory, where explanations can be 
tested unambiguously. Thus, there are plenty of good reasons for examining anxiety 
phenomenon such as worry with normal and healthy participants. Nevertheless, additional 
studies also including persons with clinical levels of worry and anxiety disordered patients 
certainly are a fruitful future endeavor. 
 
Future directions 
In the previous sections, some suggestions for further research have already been made. 
Additionally, future studies into the psychometric properties of the abbreviated form of the 
IUS and the MWQ to assess the cognitive constructs of IU and meta-worry are worthwhile. 
More generally, the relation between these cognitive constructs and worry should be 
investigated in specific groups, such as children, adolescents, and older people. So far, only 
a handful of studies have examined worry in these populations, and most of this research 
reports on the effectiveness of therapy, not on fundamental underlying processes (see for 
instance Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2004; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003; Leger, 
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 2003 for research concerned with children and adolescents, and for 
instance Ladouceur, Leger, Dugas, & Freeston, 2004; Nuevo, Montorio, & Borkovec, 2004 
for research conducted with older people; for reviews of research with regard to these 
populations, see Albano & Hack, 2004, and Beck & Averill, 2004). 
Furthermore, Taylor (1998) concludes that in order to develop a more detailed 
understanding of pathological fear and anxiety, various etiological variables ranging from 
general to more specific factors need to be included in theoretical models. He urges other 
researchers to study more of such variables, and in some studies of the thesis, this 
suggestion was (partially) followed. An increased understanding of the unique contributions 
of these variables, and the mediator and moderator effects among them could also be useful 
for the development of better forms of therapy. The results of the current thesis suggest that 
in particular interventions that aim at correcting meta-cognitive beliefs might be a valuable 
addition to cognitive-behavior therapy (van der Heiden, Muris, & van de Molen, 2005). 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that this type of therapy partially derives its 
effectiveness (Barlow, Levitt, & Bufka, 1999) because various cognitive factors are 
successfully targeted. For example, Roemer and Orsillo (2002) sum up several elements of 
cognitive-behavioral therapy that seem to be effective. These elements include psycho-
education, careful monitoring of anxious responding, coping skills, and cognitive 
restructuring. It may well be the case that psycho-education and cognitive restructuring are 
helpful for reducing maladaptive beliefs (meta-worry), the monitoring of anxiety cues and 
increasing coping skills may diminish ambiguity and feelings of uncertainty. Various authors 
have noted that it is important to determine the (cognitive) factors that mediate successful 
interventions such as cognitive-behavior therapy (Brewin, 2006).  
 All in all, the present thesis aims at providing information that further contributes to 
our knowledge on the etiology of (pathological forms of) worry. The possibilities of research 
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on worry, a phenomenon that is so common to many of us, appears almost inexhaustible. 
This research field steadily accumulates valuable insights that can be translated into more 
successful therapeutic interventions, thereby providing better chances for more people to 
live their life without the paralyzing power of fear and uncertainty. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift bevat onderzoek naar twee verschillende constructen die verondersteld 
worden bij te dragen aan een hoge mate van piekeren, en belangrijk zijn bij het ontstaan en 
de instandhouding van de gegeneraliseerde angststoornis (GAS; een stoornis waarbij 
overmatig piekeren het kernsymptoom is). Deze twee constructen zijn intolerantie voor 
onzekerheden en meta-piekeren. 
 
Intolerantie voor onzekerheden 
De twee Canadese onderzoekers Dugas en Ladouceur hebben het construct “intolerantie 
voor onzekerheden” (IO) aangevoerd als mogelijke belangrijke oorzaak van piekeren. Deze 
onderzoekers veronderstellen dat mensen die slecht tegen onzekerheden kunnen (c.q. 
hiervoor intolerant zijn) situaties sneller als ambigu waarnemen dan mensen die niet 
intolerant zijn voor onzekerheden. Vervolgens reageren zij op deze ambigue situaties door 
te gaan piekeren, om zo met die waargenomen onzekerheden om te gaan. Onderzoek heeft 
reeds aangetoond dat IO en piekeren inderdaad hoog gecorreleerd zijn. Verder zijn 
patiënten met een gegeneraliseerde angststoornis meer intolerant voor onzekerheden dan 
gezonde mensen die piekeren, en de verschillende angststoornis patiënten kunnen van 
elkaar worden onderscheiden aan de hand van IO, waarbij GAS patiënten de hoogste mate 
van IO vertonen.  
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een validatie studie naar de Nederlandse versie van de 
“Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale” (IUS). De IUS is de meest gebruikte vragenlijst om IO te 
meten. Uit dit onderzoek bleek dat IO kan worden gezien als een eendimensionaal 
construct. Verder bleek dat de interne consistentie en de test-hertest betrouwbaarheid hoog 
waren. Daarnaast bleek dat een hoge score op de “Intolerantie voor Onzekerheden Schaal” 
sterker samenhing met een hoge mate van piekeren dan met een hoge mate van depressie. 
Een regressie analyse liet verder zien dat IO significant bijdroeg aan de mate van piekeren 
als er gecorrigeerd werd voor leeftijd, geslacht, mate van angst en depressie. Ook bleek dat 
GAS patiënten en andere angststoornis patiënten significant hoger scoorden op de IO dan 
gezonde mensen. Samengevat komen de psychometrische eigenschappen van de 
Nederlandse versie van de IUS overeen met die van de Franse en Engelse versie.  
In het derde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift worden twee experimentele studies 
beschreven waarbij onderzocht werd of individuele verschillen op IU de mate van piekeren 
konden voorspellen, en wat deze verschillen voor eventuele gevolgen op gedrag had. De 
deelnemers moesten hiertoe de IUS invullen en vervolgens een al dan niet moeilijke IQ-taak 
uitvoeren. Uit het onderzoek bleek dat mensen die hoog op de IUS scoren over het 
algemeen meer piekeren over hun prestatie op de IQ-taak. Bij de groep deelnemers die de 
gemakkelijke IQ-taak moesten maken, voorspelde individuele verschillen op de IUS de mate 
van piekeren. Kennelijk heeft IO met name voorspellende waarde als er ook daadwerkelijk 
gepiekerd kan worden. Als de situatie duidelijk is, dat wil zeggen, als de taak te moeilijk is of 
te makkelijk, dan voorspelt IO de mate van piekeren niet.  
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Meta-piekeren 
De tweede lijn in de proefschrift betreft onderzoek naar het concept meta-piekeren. De 
nadruk van het meta-pieker-model dat wordt voorgesteld door Wells ligt niet op de inhoud 
van alledaags piekeren maar op de negatieve beoordeling van piekergedachten en het 
willen controleren c.q. onderdrukken van piekergedachten. De meta-cognitieve aanname dat 
piekeren “gevaarlijk” is wordt verondersteld dagelijks piekeren te veranderen in pathologisch 
piekeren. Om je eigen gedachten te kunnen beoordelen moet je natuurlijk wel eerst in een 
bepaalde mate bewust zijn van je eigen gedachten. Dit noemt men “cognitive self-
consiousness” (CSC). Uit de literatuur is gebleken dat met name patiënten met obsessief 
compulsieve stoornis (OCS) een verhoogd niveau van CSC laten zien, en niet zozeer 
patiënten met een gegeneraliseerde angststoornis (GAS). Toch is het zo dat GAS patiënten 
meer meta-piekeren dan mensen met een andere angststoornis, of dan mensen zonder een 
angststoornis.  
In hoofdstuk 4 is onderzocht wat de relatie is tussen CSC en meta-piekeren, en wat 
hun relatie is tot symptomen van GAS (piekeren) en OCS (obsessies en compulsies). De 
resultaten van dit onderzoek tonen aan dat CSC en meta-piekeren inderdaad met elkaar 
correleren. Verder bleek dat meta-piekeren samenhangt met zowel piekeren als obsessies 
en compulsies (ook als deze relatie gecorrigeerd werd voor CSC). CSC was eveneens 
gerelateerd aan piekeren, maar minder aan OCS symptomen; deze relaties verdwenen 
echter wanneer er gecorreleerd werd voor meta-piekeren. In de vervolgstudie (zie Hoofdstuk 
4.2) werd verder onderzocht in hoeverre CSC en meta-piekeren als aparte constructen 
gezien kunnen worden. Aan de hand van factoranalyse kan gesteld worden dat CSC en 
meta-piekeren inderdaad twee aparte constructen zijn. Verder werd in deze vervolgstudie 
onderzocht wat de invloed van gedachtesuppressie was in relatie tot piekeren en 
obsessieve gedachten. Men kan namelijk veronderstellen dat als je je continu bewust bent 
van je eigen gedachten (CSC) en je daarbij deze gedachten negatief beoordeelt (meta-
worry), de noodzaak om je gedachten te onderdrukken (suppressie) wordt vergroot. Echter, 
de mate van gedachtesuppressie is ook gerelateerd is aan een grotere mate van piekeren 
en OCS symptomen. De resultaten lieten zien dat alle drie deze meta-cognitieve 
constructen, CSC, meta-piekeren en suppressie, allen positief met elkaar correleerden. 
Verder werd aan de hand regressie analyses onderzocht wat de precieze bijdrage was van 
de drie meta-cognitieve constructen aan de mate van piekeren en OCS symptomen. De 
resultaten lieten zien dat piekeren het beste werd voorspeld door de constructen meta-
piekeren en suppressie. OCS symptomen werden het beste voorspeld door de constructen 
meta-piekeren en CSC. Gesteld lijkt dan te kunnen worden dat (bij gezonde mensen) de 
negatieve waardering van je eigen gedachten (meta-piekeren) het meest “vergiftigend” 
werkt en dat je het beste niet kan piekeren over je gepieker. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt een onderzoek beschreven dat de twee bovenstaande 
onderzoekslijnen combineert. In het bijzonder werd onderzocht wat de relatieve bijdrage is 
van IO en meta-piekeren aan piekeren. Piekeren werd op twee manieren 
geoperationaliseerd. De mate waarin de deelnemers in het algemeen geneigd zijn om te 
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piekeren (c.q. de karaktertrek piekeren) werd vastgesteld, alsmede de mate van piekeren 
naar aanleiding van een aankomend examen (ook wel idiosyncratisch piekeren genoemd). 
Naast IO en meta-piekeren werd ook de mate van neuroticisme gemeten, omdat bekend is 
dat deze persoonlijkheidsfactor in belangrijke mate bijdraagt aan angst in zijn algemeenheid. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat alle drie de variabelen IO, meta-piekeren en neuroticisme 
correleren met de karaktertrek piekeren. De correlaties van de drie variabelen met 
idiosyncratisch piekeren waren aanzienlijk kleiner. Door middel van het testen van mediatie 
modellen kon worden vastgesteld dat zowel IU als meta-piekeren gezien kunnen worden als 
partiële mediatoren van de relatie tussen neuroticisme en de karaktertrek piekeren. Deze 
twee variabelen waren geen mediatoren in de relatie tussen neuroticisme en idiosyncratisch 
piekeren. Echter, een regressie analyse liet zien dat de mate neuroticisme wel van invloed 
was op idiosyncratisch piekeren naarmate het examen dichtbij kwam. In het kort kan gesteld 
worden dat de algemene factor neuroticisme, en niet de specifieke variabelen IO en meta-
piekeren, de meeste verklarende kracht heeft voor zowel de karaktertrek piekeren als 
piekeren over een stressvolle gebeurtenis.  
 
Dit proefschrift heeft een bijdrage geleverd aan het onderzoek dat gedaan wordt ter 
verduidelijking van welke factoren een invloed hebben op een hoge mate van piekeren. Als 
duidelijk wordt hoe piekeren ontstaat en welke factoren dit proces beïnvloeden, dan kunnen 
er nog betere therapeutische interventies ontwikkeld worden zodat de kans bestaat dat 
minder mensen hun leven hoeven te leven in angst voor het dagelijkse bestaan en de 
toekomst. 
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Dankwoord 
Woorden van dank allereerst voor mijn begeleiders. 
Eric, aan je aparte stijl van, laten we het maar gewoon “zijn” noemen, was ik snel gewend. 
Door je typische Ericiaanse tics, je spitsvondige opmerkingen en door je humor voelde ik me 
snel op mijn gemak. Je had altijd tijd, stond open om te helpen, verduidelijkte zaken, en 
zette alle opties op een rijtje. Ik benijd je wetenschappelijk inventiviteit en nieuwsgierigheid. 
Ik hoop dat je je eerste AIO niet snel zal vergeten ;-). 
Peter, ik was al halverwege mijn AIO tijd toen je hier als hoogleraar kwam werken. Mijn 
oude stukken werden opgeknapt en nieuwe onderzoekslijnen werden uitgezet. Ik had het 
nodig dat je me aanstuurde, dat je op details hamerde en me inzicht en overzicht gaf in het 
doen van onderzoek. Mijn dank hiervoor is groot. 
En Henk M, zeer bedankt voor het mogelijk maken van mijn AIO plek. Zoals uit mijn 
dankwoord zal blijken was deze tijd voor mij zeer waardevol.  
 
Door, met en tussen de collega’s van psychologie en dankzij de ongedwongen gezellige 
sfeer, ben ik 4 jaar met plezier naar mijn werk gegaan. Ik zeg expres ook “tussen” want een 
groot deel van het voltooien van een proefschrift gebeurt in ‘t hoofd en achter de computer. 
Maar promoveren doe je toch echt niet alleen! 
Marleen, zo goed als 4 jaar op een kamer. Verwonderd hebben we wel eens geconcludeerd 
dat we elkaar vaker zagen dan wie dan ook. Wat hebben we veel met elkaar bepraat; over 
onderzoek, werk, maar vooral ook over vele (zo niet alle) privé zaken, liefdesperikelen en 
onszelf. Bedankt voor de gezelligheid! 
En dan de andere meidenkamers: Manon en Marleen S.. Manon, bedankt dat ik altijd bij je 
kon binnen lopen, met een praatje over niks, of juist over belangrijke zaken (altijd die 
mannen)! En ook al begaf mijn computer het in de final hours van mijn AIO tijd, gelukkig kon 
ik bij jou terecht voor tips en hulp bij het opmaken van mijn proefschrift. Marleen S., door 
mijn regelmatige gebinnenloop bij jullie kon je haast niet om me heen, ook al probeerde je 
altijd gedisciplineerd door te werken ;-)! Ik vond jullie luisterende oren en meningen fijn, altijd 
verliet ik jullie kamer vrolijk.  
Birgit en Marije: Ik vond het gezellig om na, voor en tijdens het checken van de post even 
een praatje te maken met jullie over alle leuke (en minder leuke dingen) van het leven. Ik 
wens jullie nog lang veel plezier op die kamer! Dames, ik hoop jullie te blijven zien! 
Ingmar, bedankt voor de gezelligheid en de praatjes over het weekend en uitgaan, maar ook 
onze gesprekken over de serieuzere zaken van het leven heb ik zeer gewaardeerd. 
En dan een aantal mensen die ik ook moet noemen: Lidia (met twee i’s), ik sprak je niet 
vaak, maar als ik je sprak was het goed. Ik hoop dat je heel gelukkig bent en blijft met je 
gezin! Ook de “derde wielen aan de wagen” ;-), de tijdelijke (extra) kamergenootjes Saskia 
en Lydia deden mij weer anders naar mijn werk en mezelf kijken, dank daarvoor. Bedankt 
ook Eveline voor de hulp bij het gereedmaken van de omslag van dit boekje. Alle andere 
fijne collega’s die hier niet met naam en toenaam worden genoemd, bedankt voor de 
gezelligheid en inspirerende gesprekken. Misschien dat de volgende zaken nog wat leuke 
herinneringen oproepen, voor mij in ieder geval wel: de Efteling, (kotsen op) wintersport, 
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